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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970298 
v. : 
GINOMAESTAS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of eight counts of aggravated robbery, first 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-3(3)(i) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony? 
2. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction? 
3. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to sever the Top 
Stop robberies from the Pizza Hut robberies? 
4. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting an instruction 
on the limited use of potential hearsay testimony? 
5. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to consolidate 
the robbery charges of the Pizza Hut and Jesse Baldwin? 
"Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present a mixed question of law and 
fact," Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)) 
6. Should defendant's convictions be reversed because of cumulative error? 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [the reviewing court] will reverse only if 'the 
cumulative effect of the several [otherwise harmless] errors undermines our confidence 
. . . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Determinative statutes and rules are set out in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gino Maestas, was charged with eight counts of aggravated robbery 
(R. 55-59). A jury convicted defendant on all counts (R. 105-12). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to eight statutory five-to-life terms, Count I consecutive to Count 
2, with a one-year consecutive firearm enhancement on each sentence (R. 114-29). 
The trial court granted defendant's petition for extraordinary relief and resentenced 
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defendant nunc pro tunc, and defendant, with newly appointed counsel, timely appealed 
(R. 136-147, 151). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 2, 1995 a Top Stop, located at 488 East 100 South, and a Pizza 
Hut, located at 787 North Redwood Road, were robbed by a lone gunman within less 
than one hour of each other (R. 267-68, 292). 
A. Top Stop Robbery. 
Paul Harbrecht was working at the Top Stop when, just after 8:00 p.m., a man 
wearing a mask, baseball cap, and a two-tone blue coat walked to the counter, pulled 
out a black, long-barreled pistol, threw a little backpack on the counter, and demanded 
that Paul put all the money in the till into the backpack (R. 268-69). The robber also 
demanded that Paul give him his wallet. Paul complied, giving the robber all the 
money that was in the till, about $30 to $40, and the $6 that was in his wallet (R. 269-
71, 286). When the robber walked out, Paul pushed a panic button, thus alerting the 
police, and ran outside where he observed the robber jog to and then get into a mid-
'80s Camaro parked about one block away (R. 271). 
Paul's initial reaction was, "Oh no, not again," having been robbed at gun point 
three or four months earlier. On this occasion Paul felt calm and had no fears for his 
safety, doing exactly as the robber ordered (R. 274). Paul concentrated on the robber's 
eyebrows and eyes, both of which were brown. He could also see the robber's nose, of 
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which only the lower part was covered by the mask, although he could not remember 
the mask's color (R. 268, 275, 277). Paul also thought the robber had a slight accent 
(R. 276). Paul additionally described the robber to Officer Rose Jones, as a male 
Hispanic in his twenties, 57" to 5*9" tall, with short dark hair, dark eyes, and an 
accent, wearing blue Levis, a white baseball cap with colored writing, and dark two-
tone blue-green coat (R. 278-79, 289).l From seventy-five to 100 yards away, Paul 
thought the car was a 70s model Camaro, gold-colored, though he told Officer Jones 
that because of the lighting he could not see the color of the car too well (R. 272, 280). 
At trial, Paul did not think that the coat, State's Exhibit 1 (SI), recovered from 
defendant's car, or the cap, State's Exhibit 2 (S2), found in his girlfriend's apartment, 
were the ones the robber was wearing (R. 269, 272). The entire incident lasted about 
one minute, or two at most (R. 271). 
While Officer Jones was filling out a report, she received an ATL (Attempt to 
Locate) on a robbery at a Pizza Hut on Redwood Road in which the description of the 
car and the suspect was "similar if not exact to the description that she had just 
received" (R. 280). Defendant was stopped in his blue 1978 Chevrolet Camaro about 
one block from the Pizza Hut about ten minutes after that robbery (R. 292, 363-67, 
418). Stating that "they had caught a suspect and she wanted [Paul] to identify him," 
1
 The booking record, completed four hours after the robbery, indicates that 
defendant was a 29 year-old Hispanic man, 5'6" tall, weighing 150 pounds, with black 
hair and brown eyes (R. 9). 
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Officer Jones transported Paul to the showup (R. 273, 282).2 Defendant was 
handcuffed, with spotlights and headlights of several vehicles on him, among from five 
to seven police officers (R. 284, 367, 375, 379, 388). Paul first identified defendant as 
the robber from his voice as he and Officer Jones drove by the showup (R. 289-90).3 
Paul then asked that defendant face him frontally because that was the position he had 
seen the robber. Without hesitation Paul identified defendant (R. 273-74, 283-84). 
Paul also identified defendant as the robber at a subsequent lineup and at trial (R. 270). 
B. The Pizza Hut Robbery 
1. Kurt Anderson - Just before 9:00 p.m., Kurt, a Pizza Hut employee, first 
noticed the robber as both he and the robber approached the counter near the cash 
register (R. 294-95). From less than five feet, Kurt observed that the robber wore a 
bluish-green and gray jacket, which Kurt identified as State's exhibit 1 (SI) (293-94). 
The robber also wore a very dark (black or Navy blue) mask covering all around his 
head and only the lower half of his nose, brown hiking boots, Levis, and a cap (S2) 
later recovered from the apartment of defendant's friend, Mary Sisneros (R. 293-94, 
305). Within this first couple of minutes, Kurt also observed that the robber walked 
2
 Defendant incorrectly states Officer Jones' said "that they had caught the 
suspect and she wanted me [Paul] to identify him." See App. Br. at 5. 
3
 Defendant suggests that hearing defendant's voice alone was insufficient for 
Paul to make an identification. App. Br. at 5. However, a plain reading of Paul's 
testimony indicates that he was confident of his voice identification and only further 
corroborated it by looking at defendant (R. 289-90). 
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with a limp (R. 304). 
The robber stuck a black revolver in Kurt's chest and ordered him to put all the 
money from the register into a whitish-colored bag (R. 295-96). Kurt was "pretty 
scared" and saw his "life flash[] before [his] eyes" (R. 295). He turned to Jesse 
Baldwin, the night manager, told Jesse what was happening, and handed Jesse the bag 
(R. 295-96). In response to the robber's command, Kurt got down on the floor with 
his head down (R. 296). From this position he was no longer able to watch the robber 
or observe his interactions with others in the restaurant (R. 296-99). However, he 
heard the robber, who had a Spanish accent, demand money from the safe, the cash 
register, and from all those in the restaurant (R. 297, 304). Kurt gave the robber $6, 
but kept his wallet (R. 297). 
Shortly after the robbery, Officer Richard Findlay took Kurt and Jesse to a 
location about a block from the restaurant "to view a possible suspect" (R. 299, 379-
80). Defendant was standing, handcuffed, standing among several patrol cars with 
their spotlights on him and their emergency lights activated (R. 300, 379). Kurt and 
Jesse discussed the similarities between defendant and the robber. Jesse said the eyes 
looked the same, and Kurt thought the shoes looked the same (R. 381-82). Both Kurt 
and Jesse became excited when Officer Cole showed them the coat (SI) recovered from 
defendant's Camaro and they said it was the coat worn by the robber (R. 382). From 
fifty feet away, Kurt was unsure that defendant was the robber; however, when he 
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came within twenty-five feet of defendant he became certain. At a lineup thirty minutes 
later, and again at trial, Kurt positively identified defendant as the robber (R. 293, 300-
01).4 
2. Jesse Baldwin - Jesse received the bag from Kurt as the robber approached 
them (R. 308). To Jesse, who was not very familiar with firearms, the revolver looked 
brown with a "shiny-chrome assemblage" (R. 308). He felt very nervous (R. 308). 
Following the robber's command, Jesse gave him about $160 to $170 from the register, 
including about $10 in change, and $15 to $20 from his own wallet, which Jesse kept 
(R. 309-13, 322). After hearing there would be a ten minute delay in opening the safe 
after the timing cycle was initiated, the robber made the rounds of the other two 
employees and the two customers remaining in the restaurant, although Jesse could not 
observe these interactions (R. 311-14). 
Jesse saw the robber for about four minutes, although sometimes the robber was 
as much as thirty to forty feet away (R. 309-11). He appeared to be in his late 
twenties, spoke with a "slight accent," had dark brown eyes, thick but not bushy 
eyebrows, and walked with a distinctive gait—an odd, off-balance posture or slight limp 
4
 The record of the lineup, admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 3 (R. 337), 
attached at Addendum B, records that defendant was #4 and that the witnesses made the 
following selections: Paul Harbrecht - #4, Kurt Anderson - #4, Jesse Baldwin - #4, 
Kara Hsiao - #4 with #7 as a possibility, Candace Hsiao - blank (non-recognition) with 
#2, #4 and #7 as possibilities, Leslie Kurys - #6, and Shelby Kurys - #7. 
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(R. 319-21, 323). Jesse had described him as weighing 180 pounds, but he was not too 
sure of that assessment (R. 320). The robber wore a black mask which seemed to 
extend all around his head, a mainly white baseball cap turned backwards, a two-tone 
"green, greenish-gray, greenish blue" coat, and Navy-blue or black pants (R. 315-16, 
319-20). Although not certain, Jesse identified exhibits SI and S2 as the coat and hat 
worn by the robber (R. 316). 
When asked by the police at the showup how sure he was on a scale of one to 
ten, ten being most positive, that defendant was the robber, Jesse initially answered, 
"Eight" (R. 317). However, when he saw the coat, SI, he was convinced without any 
question (R. 317). Jesse also correctly identified defendant at the lineup, and reasserted 
his certainty in identifying defendant at trial (R. 317, 323, 490). 
3. Candace and Kara Hsiao - Candace and her daughter, Kara, were the only 
customers in the restaurant (R. 328). Candace first noticed a "vest-type effect that was 
kind of shiny, some light blue, some light lavender" at the front of the restaurant (R. 
328). Later, the robber, a Spanish or Mexican man wearing a white turned around 
baseball cap, a black muffler covering his face from nose to throat and holding a gun, 
approached them and politely asked both Candace and Kara for their purses (R. 328, 
339). Candace "sort of block[ed] everything out" upon seeing the gun, although fear 
and "the shakes" did not set in until after the robber left (R. 330, 332). When Kara 
saw the robber with the gun, which she described as black in color and having a long 
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barrel, she felt terrified (R. 340). Candace gave the robber the pouch containing about 
$15 in bills and change from her Franklin Planner, and Kara gave him five one-dollar 
bills "all crumpled in a ball" from her pocket (R. 329-30, 334-36, 339). 
The encounter lasted about one minute (R. 332). As the robber left, Candace 
realized that it was the robber who wore the bluish-purplish clothes that earlier caught 
her eye (R. 331). She could not positively identify the coat (SI) and cap (S2) as those 
worn by the robber (R. 329). At the lineup, both she and Kara were unsure and picked 
out defendant and one or two other persons (R. 334, 337, 340, 343). Kara recognized 
the coat (SI) as that shown to her at the showup, but was not sure it was the one the 
robber wore, nor was she sure she saw the robber at the showup. She thought, but was 
not sure, he wore the cap (SI) turned around (R. 340-43). 
At trial, Candace thought defendant was like the robber in that defendant's 
eyebrows and voice were "familiar" and they were built similarly, but she could not be 
sure defendant was the robber (R. 332-33). Kara remembered the robber had a slight 
accent and, based on build and defendant' bushy eyebrows, thought defendant looked 
like the robber, but she also was not sure (R. 341, 343-44). 
5. Leslie and Shelby Kurys - Leslie and her husband, Shelby, were cleaning up 
their work stations when Shelby saw the robber walking with Kurt while holding a gun 
in his back (R. 346, 353). The robber ordered Shelby to get down, assisted Leslie to 
the floor, and politely asked for Shelby's wallet and the couple's wedding rings (R. 
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346-49, 354-56) . Both witnesses saw that the robber's gun was black, and Shelby also 
noted that it was either a .44 or .45 caliber long-barrelled revolver (R. 346, 354, 360). 
The couple refused to give up their wedding rings, and Shelby had lost his wallet, so 
the robber left the couple on the floor to try to get the safe open (R. 348, 356). 
The encounter scared Leslie; it only startled Shelby, although he was concerned 
when, after consideration, he determined the gun was real (R. 350, 355). From his 
position on the floor, Shelby did not have a clear view of the robber, except for the 
minute when the robber asked he and Shelby for their jewelry (R. 361). The robber's 
eyes appeared brown to Leslie and brown or hazel to Shelby beneath thick eyebrows 
(R. 351, 360). Leslie also recognized the robber by the way he walked— "a strut 
almost. . . like a macho ego walk" (R. 351). Shelby too noted the robber's "lazy-style 
walk . . . [not] really upright" (R. 360-61). 
Leslie thought the robber might have been wearing forest-green colored jeans, 
but because of the lighting in the restaurant it was "hard to tell what the real color of 
clothes are" (R. 347). The mask was like a scarf wrapped all around (R. 351). She 
thought the coat (SI) "look[ed] familiar," but she was "100 percent sure" that the 
robber wore the cap (S2), or one that looked like it, turned backwards (R. 348, 351). 
Shelby described the mask as dark black or gray going from the bridge of the robber's 
nose down to his throat (R. 360). He, too, did not remember if SI was the exact 
jacket, although the sleeves seemed the same color, but he identified the cap (S2) as the 
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one the robber wore, turned backwards (R. 357-58). Neither Leslie nor Shelby picked 
defendant as the robber at the lineup. Supra, n.4. At trial, both Leslie and Shelby 
identified defendant, although Shelby was not 100 percent sure (R. 347, 359). Shelby 
thought the entire episode lasted about ten minutes (R. 350). 
C. Additional Evidence. 
Officer Donald Cole was dispatched to the area of the Pizza Hut to look for a 
"male Hispanic, dark hair, dark eyes, wearing a . . . blue and green jacket." He 
received a later update that the suspect might be in a 1978 or late '70s blue Chevrolet 
Camaro. About 3 Vi to 4 blocks from the Pizza Hut he found a blue Chevrolet Camaro 
parked in an apartment driveway (R. 363). The hood felt very warm and hot air came 
from under the car. From outside the car Officer Cole observed several crumpled up 
dollar bills on the passenger seat and a blue and green jacket (SI) in the backseat (R. 
364). He placed himself in a position to safely observe. It was now about 9:00 p.m., 
only 10 minutes after he received the report of the Pizza Hut robbery (R. 365-66). 
Two people exited the apartment and got into the car. One of them removed 
something from the car, took it back to the apartment, returned, and began to drive off. 
A few blocks away, Officer Cole stopped the car. In response to Officer Cole's 
broadcast, between five to seven officers immediately assisted in the stop (R. 367). 
Defendant was driving, accompanied by Mary Sisneros (R. 369, 375). Officers 
Findlay and Jones brought the robbery victims to the scene, all of whom positively 
11 
identified defendant as the robber and the coat (SI), recovered from defendant's car, as 
the one the robber wore (R. 364, 369).5 A total of $53, including crumpled dollar 
bills, were recovered from the car and Ms. Sisneros' person; however, the gun, 
Candace's pouch, the white bag, or any change were never recovered (R. 372-73, 397-
98, 400-01, 403). When apprehended, defendant was wearing a dark-colored hooded 
sweat shirt and sweat pants (R. 387, 402-06). In a consent search of Ms. Sisneros' 
apartment, Detective Ray Dalling later found the cap (S2) and a dark blue or black neck 
gator and a similar appearing head band, the neck gator being "the type of thing that 
could be pulled up to cover the lower part of a person's face" (R. 370, 396-97).6 
Defendant testified that at about 5:30 p.m. he went to a family party at Ms. 
Sisneros' apartment and stayed there until about 8:50 p.m., when he went to the store 
with her (R. 413-14). During his visit he watched television and drank some beer (R. 
414). He asserted that (1) he did not commit the robberies, (2) on February 20, he 
weighed 135-40 pounds, (3) his eyes are green and he does not limp, (4) he never 
changed his clothes that night, (5) his Camaro is a distinctive "low rider" with chrome 
wheels and tires, (6) the crumpled one dollar bills belonged to Ms. Sisneros' children, 
and (7) he did not have a weapon that night (R. 414-423). 
5
 The record shows that Harbrecht, Anderson, Baldwin, and Kara Hsiao were at 
the showup (R. 282, 340, 379), but is silent as to Candace Hsiao or the Kurys. 
6
 The neck gator, and presumably the head band, were not collected from the 
apartment, and so did not come into evidence (R. 399). 
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Ms. Sisneros also testified that defendant was at her apartment from about 5:30 
p.m. until about 9:00 p.m., that after he helped her completely clean up from dinner he 
watched television, that he never left the whole time, and that defendant repaid a $10 
debt that evening (R. 436-39, 444, 447, 449). On rebuttal, Detective Dalling testified 
that Ms. Sisneros told him that because she was spent substantial time cleaning other 
parts of the apartment, she would not have known whether defendant left and that when 
he searched the apartment, he found food throughout the kitchen (R. 452-54). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - Defendant fails to show that his counsel's inaction in not attempting to 
suppress the eyewitness identifications of all the State's witnesses was not a consciously 
chosen, reasonable tactic. The tactic was designed to challenge the strong, consistent 
identifications of the State's three strongest witnesses, whose identifications could not 
be suppressed under State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), by preserving for 
impeachment the State's weaker witnesses. Given the strength of the several of the 
witnesses identifications, coupled with additional compelling evidence linking defendant 
to the crimes, a motion to suppress, even if granted with respect to the weaker 
eyewitnesses' testimony, would not have resulted in a more favorable outcome. 
POINT II - Competent counsel might have refrained from requesting an eyewitness 
jury instruction on the reasonable belief that the jury's focus on those particular areas 
of concern identified in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (1986), would have led to 
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crediting the identifications even more emphatically than if the instruction had not been 
given. Any error in failing to request a cautionary instruction was harmless since the 
defense theory of attacking the reliability of the identifications was evident through 
counsel's cross-examination and closing argument, the identifications were consistent 
and strong, and other circumstantial evidence was compelling. 
POINT III - Trial counsel was not ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop 
robberies from the Pizza Hut robberies because the unique similarities in the 
commission of the robberies at both locations properly allowed for joinder under the 
statute. Joinder was also not prejudicial because (1) the eyewitness identifications at 
each robbery location would have been admissible at the separate robbery at the other 
location to prove the robber's identity and refute defendant's alibi, (2) joinder did not 
compromise defendant's alibi defense, (3) evidence of each robbery was presented 
separately from the other, and (4) an instruction was given directing the jury to 
consider only evidence related to each charge. 
POINT IV - Trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to request an 
instruction restricting the substantive use of Officer Findlay's testimony about a non-
trial witness's report that a car having the same description as defendant's arrived at 
and then left the Pizza Hut just before and after that robbery. The substance of that 
testimony had been substantially admitted through three prior witnesses, and a limiting 
instruction might actually have focused the jury on the nexus between the Pizza Hut 
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robbery and the identification of defendant's car. Because almost the entire substance 
of Officer Findlay's testimony was before the jury and the very similar description of 
the car defendant was stopped in was unchallenged, a limiting instruction would not 
have affected the outcome of the case. 
POINT V - Trial counsel was not ineffective in not moving to consolidate the counts 
charging aggravated robbery of property belonging to the Pizza Hut and of Baldwin, 
personally. Relevant case law indicates that "intent" is the gravamen of the offense, 
and the evidence clearly showed that defendant had distinct and separate intents to rob 
first the Pizza Hut and then Baldwin and others in the restaurant. 
POINT VI - Because there were no substantive errors in this case, the cumulative 
error doctrine does not apply. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING 
TO SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move 
suppress the eyewitness identifications under State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 
1991). However, defendant fails to show that counsel's inaction was not a consciously 
chosen, reasonable tactic, given the weight of at least three of the witnesses' testimony, 
or that a motion to suppress would likely have resulted in a more favorable outcome, 
given its limited chance of success and the overall strength of the evidence. 
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To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 
that his trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and that there exists a 
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 
186 (Utah 1990) (same). To demonstrate objectively deficient performance, the 
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that his trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance. Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). In addition, the 
reviewing court will give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and 
will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them. 
Crosby. 927 P.2d at 644 (citing Taylor. 905 P.2d at 282). 
A. Defendant Fails to Overcome the Presumption that Not Moving to 
Suppress the Eyewitnesses9 Identification was a Reasonable Tactic, 
Defendant asserts claims that in light of Ramirez, the eyewitness identifications 
in this case were fatally flawed and that reasonable trial counsel, therefore, would have 
moved to suppress their identifications. App. Br. at 27-33. However, in evaluating the 
evidence under the Ramirez factors and comparing it with the facts of Ramirez. 
defendant has variously (1) omitted the witnesses' observation of unique identifying 
characteristics of defendant of an order not even recognized in Ramirez. (2) 
gratuitously presumed the witnesses' compromised mental states throughout the entire 
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incident, (3) overstated the suggestiveness of the showup in comparison with that in 
Ramirez. (4) and omitted facts describing conditions and circumstances of observation 
much superior to those in Ramirez. In fact, because the identifications in this case, at 
least those of Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin, were so clearly superior to the sole 
witness who identified the defendant in Ramirez, a motion to suppress would likely fail, 
and defense counsel would reasonably have chosen not to attempt to exclude other 
weaker eyewitnesses and expose his client to only strong eyewitnesses at trial. 
L The Eyewitness Identification in Ramirez was Based on Limited Capacity 
and Opportunity to Observe, Made in Poor Conditions, Inconsistent over 
Time, and Uncorroborated by Any Other Witness. 
In Ramirez, this Court extended its recognition that eyewitness testimony is both 
potent yet fallible, see State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986), thereby 
requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was central to the 
case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability," preliminary 
to admitting such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 780. Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be determined is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable," this 
Court listed the following pertinent factors by which reliability must be determined: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical 
and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
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product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, 
and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id iat781.7 
Applying the above-referenced factors to the eyewitness identification in 
Ramirez. this Court found that, although an "extremely close case," the trial court had 
properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 782-84.8 
7
 In Ramirez, two armed, masked men robbed a Pizza Hut. IcL at 776. Shortly 
before 1:00 a.m. Kathy Davis, the manager of the Pizza Hut, was preparing to leave 
the restaurant in the company of her husband, John Davis, and her brother, Gerald 
Wilson. Id. Upon leaving, they were accosted by a man (the "pipe man") wearing a 
white scarf across his face who demanded the day's receipts. IcL In the ensuing 
scuffle, the pipe man hit Wilson with the pipe and then told a previously undetected 
robber ("the gunman") to kill Wilson if he moved again. Id, The gunman, Ramirez, 
who also wore a white scarf covering most of his face, was crouched near the corner of 
the building, holding a gun. l± When the Davises returned with the bank bag, the 
robbers fled. I<L 
Ramirez, stopped by a police officer a short time after the robbery and a few 
blocks from the Pizza Hut, became a suspect when, through radio broadcasts, he was 
found to match the description of one of the robbery suspects IdL at 776-77. Police 
transported the Davises and Wilson to the scene of Ramirez's detention, apparently 
informing them that "the officers had found someone who matched the description of 
one of the robbers." IcL at 777. When the witnesses arrived at the showup, Ramirez, a 
dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. IcL He was 
the only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were turned on him. 
Id. The witnesses viewed him from a patrol car. IcL Only Wilson was able to identify 
Ramirez as the gunman; the other two witnesses were unable to identify him as one of 
the robbers. KL 
8
 Regarding the first factor, the witness's opportunity to view the actor during 
the event, this Court noted Wilson varied in his statements about how long he viewed 
the gunman, from "a few seconds" or "a second," to "a minute" or longer. Ramirez, 
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817 P.2d at 782. The evidence indicated that the gunman was crouched by the end of 
the building, that Wilson viewed him from between ten to thirty feet, that at one point 
his view was obstructed, that the lighting was variously described from good to poor 
and the gunman was in a shadowy area, and that Wilson could only determine that the 
gunman's eyes were small. Id. at 782-83. 
As to the second factor, the witness's attention to the actor, Wilson was fully 
aware that a robbery was taking place and claimed to have focused on the gunman to 
the exclusion of the pipe man, even though he was still threatened by the pipe man 
when he saw the gunman and gave a much more detailed description of the pipe man 
than of the gunman at the time of the robbery. Id at 783. 
Regarding the third factor, the witness's capacity to observe the actor during the 
event, this Court found that it was reasonable to assume that Wilson experienced "a 
heightened degree of stress," since, in struggling with his assailant, the witness was hit 
once in the stomach with the pipe and almost hit a second time. Wilson described his 
eyesight as good with his glasses, and f,[a]side from the late hour and the injury from 
the pipe blow," there was no record evidence of any other physical impairments. Id 
The fourth reliability concerns whether the identification was spontaneous and 
remained consistent or whether it was the product of suggestion. IcL In Ramirez, this 
Court found that thirty minutes to an hour between the robbery and the identification 
was minimal and that other than the "normal agitation" attendant on being robbed there . 
was no indication that Wilson's mental capacity affected his identification. Id at 783. 
Although he was aware that one of the other witnesses had not identified Ramirez, he 
was not otherwise exposed to other identifications or opinions, and neither of the other 
two witnesses identified Ramirez as the gunman. IcL However, the witness's 
physical descriptions of the gunman were "confused." Id Wilson gave a very detailed 
description of the pipe man, but merely described the gunman as "a male Mexican, five 
feet nine inches to six feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levi's, with a white scarf 
around the lower part of his face." IdL John Davis, on the other hand, described 
Ramirez as five foot six inches tall and wearing a red and white cap. Id at 784. 
Although Ramirez had readily visible tatoos on his arms, Wilson did not mention them 
at the time of the robbery or at the preliminary hearing, stating for the first time at trial 
that he had seen them on the gunman. Id At the time of arrest, Ramirez was wearing 
Levis and a blue sweatshirt with paint spattered on the front, but which may have been 
worn inside out and a brown baseball cap. Id, At the suppression hearing, Wilson 
positively stated that the gunman wore no hat, although at trial he was not sure. Id 
Most "troublesome" for this Court was the "blatant suggestiveness" of the 
showup, which, as in this case, involved the lone suspect, handcuffed to a fence, the 
target of headlights, and surrounded by police who had indicated to witnesses that they 
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Notwithstanding the problematic showup in an "extremely close case," this Court, 
upheld the trial court's denial of Ramirez's motion to suppress, finding that it could not 
say that Wilson's testimony was legally insufficient to warrant a preliminary finding of 
reliability. Id at 784. 
2. The Eyewitness Identifications in This Case Were Far Superior to 
the Sole Identification of the Eyewitness in Ramirez. 
Contrary to defendant's claims, see App. Br. at 27, 33, the identifications in this 
case are far superior to the sole identification in Ramirez, and would be admissible in 
spite of the fact that the trial court did not have the opportunity to review the evidence. 
a. Paul Harbrecht - Top Stop. Paul's opportunity and capacity to observe the 
robber were excellent and his attention to him obviously focused. Paul viewed the 
robber frontally for a minute or two, evidently from a few feet, based on the nature of -
their encounter, in the light of the Top Stop's interior (R. 271, 284, 294-96). There is 
no indication of other distractions, and Paul reported feeling "calm" and without fear 
for his safety, complying with the robber's orders and concentrating on the robber's 
eyes and eyebrows, all in the context of his having been robbed at gunpoint in the Top 
had located someone who fit one of the robber's description. IcL The suggestiveness 
of the showup was compounded because none of the witnesses ever saw the gunman 
without the mask, and the sole identifying witness made his identification based only on 
the gunman's eyes, a view of which this Court assumed must have been compromised 
by the gunman's wearing a hat. IcL This Court somewhat discounted the racial 
distinction because the identification was based only one the gunman's eyes, physical 
size and clothing. IdL 
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Stop three or four months earlier (R. 274-75). His description of the robber was 
remarkably close to the official description made when defendant was booked (R. 9, 
278-79, 289). Approaching the showup, virtually the same as in Ramirez. Paul first 
recognized defendant from his voice, which carried a slight accent (R. 276, 289-90). 
When shown defendant frontally, Paul identified him as the robber without hesitation 
even before defendant was pointed out as the suspect, an identification that remained 
consistent at the lineup and at trial (R. 270-74, 283-84). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, there is no evidence that Paul was distracted or that Officer Jones believed or 
communicated that defendant was the robber. She merely informed the witness, as did 
officers in Ramirez. that they had caught a suspect (R. 282). 
b. Kurt Anderson - Pizza Hut. Kurt observed the robber for a couple of 
minutes at an angle as they both approached the counter near the cash register, and then 
from less than five feet when the robber demanded money (R. 294-96, 303-04). In 
those circumstances, he saw the robber's bluish-green coat (SI), whitish cap (S2), both 
of which he positively identified at trial, and his brown hiking boots (R. 293-94). He 
was admittedly frightened and after being ordered to the floor was no longer able to 
watch the robber, thought he heard the robber's Spanish accent and observed that the 
robber walked with a limp (R. 295-96, 304). Minutes later, at the showup, Kurt, 
though near-sighted, positively identified defendant from within twenty-five feet (R. 
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300).9 Although he later exchanged observations with Jesse Baldwin while viewing 
defendant, he and Jesse apparently recognized the coat (SI) independently, both men 
becoming excited when it was shown to them (R. 381-82). Thirty minutes later, and 
again at trial, Kurt identified defendant as the robber (R. 193, 300-01). 
c. Jesse Baldwin - Pizza Hut. Jesse also viewed the robber under favorable 
conditions for about four minutes, and although he was sometimes as much as thirty or 
forty feet from the robber, he was evidently much closer when Kurt, who was within 
five feet of the robber, handed him the robber's bag to be filled with cash from the 
register (R. 308-11). Though very nervous, he gave a focused description of the 
robber, detailing his age ("late twenties"), voice ("slight accent"), eye color ("dark 
brown"), eyebrows ("thick but not too bushy"), and distinctive gait ("slight limp"), and 
his clothes, a white baseball cap turned backwards and a two-tone greenish-blue coat, 
all of which was consistent with descriptions given by other witnesses (R. 351-16, 319-
21, 323). At the showup, Jesse had some initial question (eight on a one to ten scale), 
but became certain when he was shown defendant's coat, which he positively identified 
as the robber's at trial (R. 317). Jesse was consistent in identifying defendant both at 
the lineup and at trial (R. 317, 323, 490). 
d. Candace and Kara Hsiao - Pizza Hut. Candace and Kara similarly viewed 
9
 Anderson is near-sighted; the record is silent about whether he was wearing 
his corrective glasses when he saw the robber or identified him at the showup (R. 300). 
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the robber under favorable conditions for about one minute (R. 332). Both women, 
however, were very afraid (R. 330, 340). Kara was unsure if she saw the robber at the 
showup (R. 340). At the lineup, both women were unsure of their choices and picked 
out defendant and one or two other persons (R. 334, 337, 340, 343). At trial, Kara 
thought defendant looked like the robber and that the cap (S2) might have been the one 
the robber wore, but neither woman could positively identify defendant as the robber or 
the coat (SI) as that worn by the robber (R. 329, 332-33, 340-43). In spite of their 
uncertain identifications, Candace testified consistently with other witnesses that the 
robber was a Spanish or Mexican man whose voice and eyebrows were similar to 
defendant's and who wore a mask, a white turned around baseball cap, and a bluish-
purplish coat (R. 328, 331). Similarly, Kara said that the robber had a slight accent, 
bushy eyebrows, a turned-around cap and brown and green hiking boots (R. 341-44). 
e. Leslie and Shelby Kurys - Pizza Hut. Shelby had a clear view of the robber 
for about one minute, evidently from very close range since Shelby was with Leslie 
when the robber assisted her to the floor and politely asked for the couple's wedding 
rings (R. 346, 348-49, 361). Leslie was within five feet of the robber, and although 
scared, focused sufficiently to notice that his eyes were brown, to find the coat (SI) 
"familiar," and to positively assert that the robber wore the cap (S2) backwards (R. 
347-48, 350-51). Shelby was only startled by the encounter, focusing on whether or 
not the gun was real (R. 355). He observed that the robber's eyes were brown or 
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hazel, beneath thick eyebrows and that the robber wore the cap (S2) turned backwards 
(R. 360). The couple both recognized the robber's distinct gait, and although neither of 
them identified defendant at the lineup, they did so at trial, although Shelby was not 
100 percent sure (R. 351, 360-61, 347, 359). 
With the possible exception of the Hsiaos' identifications, the identifications in 
this case, particularly those of Harbrecht and Baldwin, were clearly superior to that of 
Wilson, the sole eyewitness in Ramirez. The witnesses' observations of the robber 
were made in intrinsically better lighting conditions, over a longer period, generally 
from within a few feet. Harbrecht particularly concentrated on the robber's face, and 
neither he nor Shelby Kurys were apparently distressed by the encounter. None of the 
witnesses in this case were under the special stress of being physically attacked with a 
dangerous weapon and suffering an injury with threats of other blows as Wilson was. 
Moreover, the uniformity of each witness's description of the robber's eye color, 
eyebrows, accented speech, distinctive walk and clothing lends weight to the accuracy 
of their individual observations and clearly distinguishes this case from Ramirez, where 
the descriptions of the principal witnesses differed substantially from one another and 
changed in the course of the proceedings.10 Additionally, there were consistencies in 
10
 Additionally, Harbrecht's physical description of the robber closely matched 
that of defendant when he was booked, and although Baldwin guessed the robber 
weighed 180 pounds, as opposed to the 150 pounds noted in the booking record, he 
acknowledged that he was not to sure of that observation (R. 9, 279, 320). 
Constitutional unreliability is not based on such minor inconsistencies. See State v. 
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the Hsiao's and the Kurys observations of such subtle features as the robber's being 
polite, and Harbrecht's immediate identification of the robber's voice at the showup, 
completely absent from the Ramirez scenario. Finally the showups in both this case 
and in Ramirez were virtually identical, and differed only to the extent that Anderson 
and Baldwin compared their impressions on a couple of points as they viewed 
defendant. However, even that small distinction fades in the face of their spontaneous 
recognition of the coat found in defendant's car, an item they both readily identified at 
trial. In sum, the eyewitness identifications in this case, with the possible exception of 
the Hsiaos', were clearly superior to Wilson's unsuppressed identification in Ramirez. 
3. Considering the Strength of Some of the Identifications in This Case, 
A Reasonable Tactic Would be to Preserve the Weaker Identifications 
For Impeachment. 
"'" The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance."'" State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 44 
(Utah 1996)(citations omitted). Because the eyewitness identifications of at least 
Harbrecht, Anderson and Baldwin, were so much more reliable than Wilson's 
unsuppressed identification in Ramirez, a motion to suppress these identifications would 
Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Utah App. 1995)(finding insignificant "minor" 
inconsistencies in identification where victim had adequate opportunity to observe her 
assailant); State v. Mincy. 838 P.2d 648, (Utah App. 1992)(finding identification 
reliable even though eyewitness mistakenly thought the defendant might have been 
wearing shorts and been one of her high school classmates)(citing with approval State 
v. Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1983)). 
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have been futile. Therefore, this Court should not second-guess trial counsel's 
probable decision not to have wasted valuable preparation time in attempting to 
suppress identifications that would have been held constitutionally reliable. 
More significantly, it may reasonably be presumed that trial counsel in this case 
recognized that, at the very most, he might be successful in suppressing the Hsiao's 
identifications, and less probably, the Kurys' identifications. If successful, however, 
defendant would be faced at trial with the strongest identifications, uncompromised by 
the weaker eyewitness identifications he might otherwise have substantially impeached 
in cross-examination and effectively argued against in closing. In the circumstances of 
this case, it was reasonable trial strategy to forego suppression entirely, a tactic which 
this Court and others have found sufficient to rebut claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See State v. VillarreaL 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995)(upholding court of 
appeals' conclusion that trial counsel's not objecting to references to seemingly 
prejudicial evidence of defendant's probationary record, dismissed criminal charges or 
victim's testimony, was "deliberate strategy falling well within the standard of 
reasonable professional performance"); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 
1989)(reasonable strategy in foregoing attempt to exclude conceivably inadmissible, 
videotaped child hearsay statements and focus instead on "less sympathetic" adult 
psychologist who could be shown to have employed "techniques akin to 
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brainwashing"), cert, denied. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990)." 
In this case, defense counsel cross-examined the witnesses on any limitations of 
their observations, inconsistencies in their identifications, the suggestiveness of the 
showup and any uncertainty in their in-court identifications (R. 275-77, 303-04, 319-
21, 334, 343-45, 351-52, 359-61), all of which he developed to show asserted 
distinctions from defendant's actual appearance (R. 415, 420-21), and highlighted in 
closing argument (R. 497-502, 506-08).12 Although counsel's strategy did not produce 
the desired result, "an unfavorable result is not sufficient for and does not give rise to a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 
11
 See also Commonwealth v. Conceicao. 446 N.E.2d 383, 389 (Mass. 1983)(no 
ineffective assistance in declining to file motion to suppress, alleging suggestive 
photographic identification with "minimal chance of success," or based on tactical 
choice to instead cross-examine witnesses extensively and strenuously argue the 
weakness of the identification testimony); Commonwealth v. Levia. 431 N.E.2d 928, 
933 (Mass. 1982)(tactical decision to forego attempted suppression of weaker of two 
identification witnesses and seek "spillover" effect from impeachment on cross-
examination, and noting, in support of that strategy, that the defense counsel cross 
examined the weaker witness extensively and argued the weaknesses of his 
identification testimony in closing). 
12
 For example, in cross-examining Harbrecht, counsel highlighted the extent to 
which the mask covered the robber's face, and that the witness failed to observe details, 
including the coat (SI) and the cap (S2) which other witnesses identified (R. 275-77). 
Counsel was most effective with witnesses who were unsure of their identification. In 
cross-examining Kara Hsiao, for example, he brought out her unique observation that 
the robber was wearing a white sweatshirt, and that she did not specifically identify 
defendant at the lineup or showup, and was uncertain about the cap (S2), the color of 
the robber's eyes, or of her in-court identification (R. 343-44). He also elicited further 
testimony on the allegedly suggestive circumstances of the showup (R. 375, 388). 
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(Utah 1993)(citation omitted). 
B. Defendant Fails to Show that He was Prejudiced as a Result of 
His Trial Counsel's Not Moving to Suppress the Identifications, 
Defendant claims that prejudice is evident since this case is "even closer than 
Ramirez." and lacks a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
admissibility, which in Ramirez this Court deferred to. He further mistakenly and 
illogically argues that it would be inappropriate for this Court to make its own findings 
and conclusions in the absence of those of the trial court. App. Br. at 33-34. 
As set out above, this case is not nearly as "close" as Ramirez, since there is no 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have suppressed the testimony 
eyewitness testimony of at least Harbrecht, Anderson, Baldwin, and the Kurys.13 
Therefore, the absence of findings and conclusions does not present the same difficulty 
as in Ramirez. This case is also not like Ramirez, where this Court held that the trial 
court had "abdicated" its duty to rule and make findings "when the issue [of 
suppression of illegal search and seizure was] raised." Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787 
13
 See State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187, (Utah 1987)(fmding no abuse of 
discretion in trial court's refusal to exclude "equivocal" eyewitness testimony of 
identifications made in less that opportune circumstances under pre-Long standard), 
cert, denied. 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Perrv. 899 P.2d 1232, (Utah App. 
1995)(finding eyewitness identification reliable even though victim, during a nighttime 
assault where threatened with a knife, viewed her assailant by street lights and possibly 
the dome of her car for about twenty seconds and later at a suggestive showup). 
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(emphasis added).14 In this case, the trial court was never asked to rule on the 
admissibility of the identifications. Moreover, defendant explicitly begs this Court to 
rule without findings and conclusions, since he has argued that the record is adequate to 
permit a decision even though the claim of ineffective assistance was not raised in the 
trial court. App. Br. at 16 n.4, 28 n.8 (citing Hovater. 914 P.2d at 40). 
Finally, any error in trial counsel's failure to move to suppress the identifications 
was harmless. As argued above, there is no reasonable probability that under Ramirez, 
the identifications of at least Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin would have been 
suppressed. Cf Nelson. 950 P.2d at 944 (harmful error where trial court blatantly 
disregarded its gatekeeping function and permitted testimony of sole eyewitness which 
resulted in conviction). 
In addition to the consistent, definitive identifications of Harbrecht, Anderson, 
and Baldwin, there was also Harbrecht's observation that the robber drove a 70s or 
mid-80s Camaro (R. 271). In fact, defendant was stopped a short time after the Pizza 
Hut robbery in his 1978 Chevrolet Camaro (R. 368, 418). The Camaro was located 
just minutes after the Pizza Hut robbery at Ms. Sisneros apartment, where defendant 
claimed to have been all evening, but the hood was very warm and hot air came from 
14
 See also State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997)(conviction 
vacated where, following motion to suppress and proffer of expert, trial court 
"sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by failing to determine the constitutional 
admissibility of the eyewitness testimony"). 
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under it (R. 363-66, 413). The robber took five crumpled one-dollar bills from Kara 
Hsiao (R. 339). Officer Cole saw several crumpled-up dollar bills on the Camaro's 
passenger seat when he first approached it (R. 364). The coat (SI) and the cap (S2) 
that most of the witnesses, including Anderson and Baldwin, identified as the robber's 
were found in the Camaro and Sisneros' apartment, respectively (R. 293-94, 316, 364, 
370). Detective Dalling also found in the apartment a dark blue or black neck gator 
capable of concealing the lower part of the face (R. 396-97). In sum, even if some of 
the eyewitness identifications had been suppressed, it would not have resulted in a more 
favorable verdict, considering the additional compelling evidence. 
POINT II - TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT ASKING 
FOR A CAUTIONARY EYEWITNESS INSTRUCTION 
Even if defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress the 
eyewitness identifications, the error was, at most, harmless. Defendant first argues that 
on the facts of this case and this Court's holding in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (1986), 
his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a cautionary eyewitness instruction 
because there was no tactical reason for omitting such an instruction. App. Br. at 24. 
In support, defendant argues at length Long's underlying rationales and their 
application to this case. 
In Long, this Court, considering substantial empirical research, recognized the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony. Long. 721 P.2d at 488-92. 
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Recognizing also that jurors do not commonly appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony, tending to convict even when an eyewitness had been substantially 
discredited, this Court "abandoned its] discretionary approach to cautionary jury 
instructions and directed] that in cases tried from this date forward, trial courts shall 
give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case 
and such an instruction is requested by the defense." ML at 492. 
Defendant argues that an instruction Long found provisionally acceptable, see kL 
at 494-95 n.8, would have educated the jury that the various witnesses' opportunity and 
capacity to observe the robber were deficient and that the identifications were not the 
product of the witnesses' own memories, evidenced by the suggestiveness of the 
showup and the courtroom and some witnesses' inability to identify defendant at the 
lineup. App. Br. at 22-23.15 
Contrary to defendant's argument, competent counsel might have reasonably 
refrained from requesting an eyewitness instruction focusing the jury on those particular 
areas of concern identified in Long. 721 P.2d at 493, and applied in Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
at 781. While focusing on the unappreciated problems of eyewitness identification, this 
Court also recognized that "[a] cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea." Long. 
721 P.2d at 492 n.5. The Court then cited research indicating that when the instruction 
15
 This Court's opinion in Long, containing the provisionally accepted 
cautionary eyewitness instruction, is attached at Addendum C. 
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in United States v. Telfaire. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), also found provisionally 
acceptable by this Court, see id at 493, was given in conjunction with "strong 
eyewitness testimony, it bolstered juror's beliefs in the correctness of the 
identification." IcL at 492 n.5. Had trial counsel requested an instruction, he might 
reasonably have assumed that in applying the criteria for evaluating reliability, the jury 
would have been more likely to convict than without such an explicit measuring stick. 
As argued at Point IA2 of this brief, the witnesses' identifications were made in 
good conditions with sufficient time to observe the robber at close range. Although 
most of the witnesses reported some degree of fear, the substantial consistency of their 
identification of defendant's features and apparel belies that stress was a significant 
factor, and Harbrecht and Shelby Kurys convincingly denied any special stress at all. 
None of the additional "capacity" factors suggested in the Long instruction, to wit: 
uncorrected visual defects, fatigue or injury, or drugs or alcohol appear to compromise 
the identifications. The witnesses were obviously focused on the event. Admittedly, 
he showup appears much the same as in Ramirez, and the Kurys did faile to identify 
defendant at the lineup. However, reasonable counsel might have concluded that the 
jury's item by item accounting of criteria, while beneficial in considering the testimony 
of lesser witnesses like the Hsiao's, would be too damaging with stronger witnesses like 
Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin. 
Even if it was error for trial counsel to refrain from requesting a cautionary 
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instruction, the error was harmless. Defendant essentially argues that the trial court's 
failure to give a cautionary instruction when eyewitness identification is central to the 
case constitutes a failure to instruct the jury on a defendant's theory of the case and is 
error per se. App. Br. at 24. First, the directive in Long, that the trial court give a 
cautionary instruction in an appropriate case only when one is requested by counsel, 
makes clear that the matter is largely one of lawyerly discretion. Second, State v. 
Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), relied on by defendant, presents an altogether 
different scenario than this case. See id at 78-79 (substantial likelihood that refusal to 
give requested instructions, couple with inaccurate voluntary intoxication instruction, 
and instruction inadequately distinguishing between general and specific intent, resulted 
injury's being confused and misled). 
Also, this Court has effectively found harmless a failure to give a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction upon less compelling facts than in this case. In 
State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985),16 the victim was with her assailant for 
about twenty minutes, during which the defendant violently raped the victim by 
knifepoint in a darkened apartment. Id at 343-44. Although the victim described her 
16
 In State v. Jonas. 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), a post-Long decision 
reviewing a pre-Long claim of error, this Court found the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to give a cautionary instruction. Id,, at 1380-81. Distinguishing the 
case, the Court stated that, "[h]owever, in all of the pre-Long cases, unlike the one 
before us, it is highly likely that the result would have been exactly the same even if a 
cautionary instruction had been given," citing, among other cases, State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). Id, 
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assailant physically, her identification was based on his voice. Id. at 344. There was 
some evidence that the defendant had attempted to approach the victim at the local 
grocery store where the victim worked and near which the defendant lived and that 
defendant had been near the scene of the crime at the time of the offense, although 
defendant offered alibi testimony in opposition. IcL In this case, as argued at Point 
IA2 and IB, above, seven witnesses testified with substantial consistency, albeit with 
varying degrees of assurance, that defendant was the robber, basing their identification 
on the robber's face and unique voice and gait. The circumstantial evidence, consisting 
of identifying the robber's clothes and Camaro, the presence of crumpled dollar bills 
like those taken from Kara Hsiao, and evidence that the Camaro had just been used, in 
contravention of defendant's testimony, is clearly stronger than in Booker. See also 
State v. Bruce. 779 P.2d 646, 652 (Utah 1989)(any error in failing to give cautionary 
instruction harmless where four witnesses identified the defendant as robber at trial 
even though all four failed to identify him at lineup and two identified wrong person). 
Finally, any harm in the jury's not receiving a cautionary instruction was 
substantially mitigated by trial counsel's (1) opening statement, which alleged the 
eyewitnesses' inconsistent descriptions of the robber (R. 266), (2) cross-examination, 
which challenged each witness's identification (R. 275-77, 304, 320-21, 334, 343-44, 
351, 359-61), and (3) closing argument, in which trial counsel pointed out the 
weaknesses of every witness's identification and how defendant's actual description 
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differed from the witnesses description of the robber (R. 497-502, 506-08), all of which 
focused the jury's attention on the centrality of the identifications. See Bruce. 779 P.2d 
at 652 (no prejudice where the "defense counsel1 s cross-examination of the State's 
witnesses and extensive closing argument more than sufficiently alerted the jury to the 
possibility of error in eyewitness identification"). Further, the trial court's instructions 
generally informed the jury that it was (1) to determine the facts from a comparison of 
the evidence (R. 72), (2) the exclusive judge of a witness's credibility, partly based on 
whether the witness had contradicted himself on the witness's "opportunity to know," 
"capacity to remember," and "accuracy" (R. 73), and (3) to judge guilt only upon proof 
beyond reasonable doubt based on the evidence (R. 93). See People v. Wright. 755 
P.2d 1049, 1062-65 (Cal. 1988)(finding harmless failure to give cautionary eyewitness 
instruction where, in addition to overall strength of the State's case and weak alibi, 
counsel's opening and closing arguments and cross-examination, in conjunction jury 
instructions, directed jury's attention to issue of reliability of identifications). In sum, 
any error in omitting a cautionary instruction was harmless. 
POINT III - DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORMED EFFECTIVELY 
AS THE TOP STOP AND THE PIZZA HUT ROBBERIES WERE 
PROPERLY JOINED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-l (1995) 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever 
the Top Stop robbery from the Pizza Hut robberies. App. Br. at 35. Under a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to move for severance of the 
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charges, a defendant must show (1) that the motion for severance should have been 
granted, and (2) ,,4a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different/" State v. 
Hallett. 796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted). "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." State 
v. Seel. 827 P.2d 954, 958 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1992) 
(citation omitted). Defendant fails to meet either prong of the Hallett test. 
A. Severance Would Not Have Been Granted as Joinder was Proper and 
Not Prejudicial To Defendant Under Utah Code Ann, § 77-8a-l (1995), 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1995) provides, in pertinent part: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if 
the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together 
in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses . . ., the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts . . . . 
Defendant must show that the offenses were improperly joined under section 77-8a-
1(1), or that even if properly joined, the charges should have been severed under 
section 77-8a-l(4)(a) if defendant was prejudiced by the joinder. See State v. Lee, 831 
P.2d 114, 117-18 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
Although this Court has not yet directly addressed the application of this statute, the 
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Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted under section 77-8a-l(l), "part of a common 
scheme or plan," see Lee, 831 P.2d at 117-18, and "otherwise connected together in 
their commission," in State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996), cert 
denied. 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997) and State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 
1997). However, it has not addressed the interpretation of "same conduct" or 
"otherwise connected together in their commission" under facts relating to a crime 
spree similar to this case.17 
1- "Same Conduct" 
Defendant argues that the plain reading of "same conduct" is that "the act which 
led to the first charge must also cause the other charges." App. Br. at 40. However, 
defendant's reading is self-servingly narrow. In State v. Gotfrey. 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1979), this Court considered the propriety of joinder under Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-31 
(1953), the former joinder statute, employing language arguably reaching the concept 
as "same conduct," to wit: "crimes . . . are of the same or similar character, or are 
based on the same act or transaction." IcL at 1328. Without mentioning any causal 
connection, this Court held joinder improper because the charges of rape and sodomy 
involving three separate victims and incidences several months apart, were "not of such 
similarity in character and circumstances of commission" Id. Courts applying similar 
17
 Given the lack of precise authority, this Court can look to other states' 
interpretation of similar language. Lee, 831 P.2d at 117. 
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language as in Gotfrey. under factual situations similar to this case have found joinder 
proper.18 Further, courts evaluating the terms "same course of conduct" or "same 
conduct" have upheld joinder in the same circumstances as this case, where defendant, 
within one hour, robbed by gunpoint two businesses separated by a few miles.19 
2 - "Otherwise Connected Together In Their Commission" 
Defendant argues that the term "otherwise connected together in their 
commission applies only where "the conduct in one crime precipitates the conduct in 
another crime," citing Smith in support. App. Br. at 38-39. However, Smith merely 
recognizes that that term clearly embraces the "precipitation" circumstance, not that the 
term applies exclusively to such circumstance. See Smith. 927 P.2d at 652-53. In fact, 
joinder has been upheld under the same operative term where, as in this case, one 
offense did not precipitate another, but rather the offenses were very similar, closely 
18
 See State v. Brown. 504 So.2d 1025, 1027-29 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (single 
morning crime spree, lead to the proper joining of three counts of armed robbery 
involving three separate victims in three separate locations); State v. Smith. 735 
S.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (armed robbery counts and second degree 
murder count properly joined together where defendant used similar tactics and all 
crimes were within 24 hours of each other). 
19
 See United States v. Tavlor. 97 F.3d 1360, 1365 (10th Cir. 1996) (joinder of 
similarly committed drug offenses under Federal Sentencing Guidelines as "same 
course of conduct," where "the guideline term contemplates that there be sufficient 
similarity and temporal proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of 
criminal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct"); Jones v. State. 487 S.E.2d 
62, 65 (Ga. App. Ct. 1997) (joinder of two robberies as "same conduct," committed 
four hours apart, in the same geographic area, and in an almost identical manner 
constituted a single "crime spree"). 
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related in time, and involved different victims, as in this case. See Markee v. State, 
494 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (joinder based "on same conduct or on a 
series of acts connected together" was proper where "evidence showed what amounted 
to a three-day, non-stop crime spree"). Thus, the aggravated robberies were correctly 
joined under the "connected together in their commission" variant of the statute. 
3 - "Part of a Common Scheme or Plan " 
In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant induced a gay 
man to ride with him on the defendant's motorcycle up into a local canyon where the 
defendant robbed the victim at knife point and then left them unclothed, all of which 
conduct he repeated with a different gay man from a different bar five nights later. Id, 
at 118. The court stated: 
"
4[i]n order for two crimes to be classified as a common scheme or plan 
. . . it is not necessary that the crimes be perpetrated in an absolutely 
identical manner, so long as the court perceives a sufficient similarity 
between the crimes to make it probable they were committed by the same 
person.'" 
Lee, 831 P.2d at 117 (citation omitted). Applying this analysis, the court found that 
"the striking similarities in Lee's conduct in each incident, coupled with the close 
proximity in time of the offenses, supplied a sufficient basis for the trial court to 
conclude that the crimes were 'alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan' 
under section 77-8a-l(l)." Id. at 118. 
The same analysis and outcome apply to this case. The robber used precisely 
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the same tactics in committing eight aggravated robberies of two very similar 
businesses and six individuals within one hour. Specifically, the robber walked into 
two food convenience establishments, the Top Stop and Pizza Hut, on the same night 
between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. (R. 268, 292). In each store, he pulled out a gun, 
handed the man by the till a bag and demanded the money. (R. 268, 295). In each 
case, after he got the money from the registers, the robber demanded of each victim his 
or her personal money, but allowed each victim to retain his or her other valuable 
personal property, to wit: Harbrecht, Anderson, and Baldwin were allowed to keep 
their wallets and the Kurys were allowed to keep their wedding rings (R. 270, 297, 
309, 312, 328, 339, 356). Finally, although the robber attempted to conceal his 
identity in both instances with a mask (R. 268, 305), each victim identified defendant as 
the robber (R. 270, 293, 308, 333, 341, 347, 354). Given the striking similarities of 
the robberies, joinder was proper under section 77-8a-l(l), and trial counsel was not 
ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop and Pizza Hut robberies. 
B. Defendant Was Not Prejudiced by Joinder as Evidence of the 
Robberies would be Allowed at Separate Trials Under Rule 404(b). 
"'The burden of demonstrating prejudice is a difficult one . . . . ' " Smith, 927 
P.2d at 654 (citation omitted). "It is not enough to claim the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome . . . ." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986). "The threshold inquiry as to whether joinder is prejudicial to a defendant is 
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whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial," 
under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Lee, 831 P.2d at 118 (citing State v. 
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)). Rule 404(b) provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.20 
Defendant in this case put his identity directly at issue by his substantial attempt 
at concealment of his identify and the use of an alibi defense. See People v. Gutierrez. 
622 P.2d 547, 522 (Colo. 1981)(testimony rebutting alibi admissible despite prejudicial 
effect). Given the unique manner by which defendant committed the robberies, 
testimony to prove identity as to each robbery, if severed, was properly admissible in 
the trial of the other robbery.21 
Recently amended rule 404(b), effective February 11, 1998, additionally 
provides: "In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is 
relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of rules 402 and 403." 
Utah R. Evid. 404 advisory committee note. 
21
 See State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 428-29 (Utah 1989)(recognizing that a 
modus operandi, "similarity . . . peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct," 
admissible to show identity); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Utah 
1987)(unrelated forgery to prove identity in burglary and forgery case probative under 
rule 404(b)); State v. Lvnch. 792 P.2d 167, 169-70 (Wash Ct. App. 1990)(unusual and 
distinctive mode of crime commission permitted evidence of two offenses to prove 
identity). At the very least, the fact of defendant's being a robbery suspect and the 
owner of a Camaro was admissible in each robbery, first in the Top Stop case to make 
clear why Harbrecht and Officer Jones went to a showup, and then in the Pizza Hut 
robbery to explain why Officer Cole was "initially" searching for "a male Hispanic, 
41 
Further, evidence of each convenience store robbery was not overly prejudicial 
in the jury's consideration of evidence in the other convenience store robbery, under 
rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. First, the identification evidence for each robbery 
was probative, but not overwhelming, and was the only means of rebutting defendant's 
alibi which applied equally to both robberies. See Lee, 831 P.2d at 118-19 (finding 
joinder proper under rule 404(b) where need for testimony bearing on intent great and 
probativeness of other offense on that point substantial enough to outweigh prejudice). 
Second, evidence of each robbery was presented simply and sequentially, minimizing 
any possible confusion of factual issues. State v. . 615 P.2d 190, 199 (Mont. 1980) 
(no prejudice from cumulation of evidence in multiple counts when the evidence 
presented at trial is simple and distinct). Third, joinder did not compromise the alibi 
defense because it applied equally to both convenience store robberies. Finally, an 
instruction was given directing the jury to consider only the evidence relevant to that 
charge and to not allow its disposition on one charge to affect its verdict on another (R. 
84, attached at Addendum D). The instruction, precisely the same as one given in State 
v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990), would have mitigated the effect of whatever 
alleged prejudice attached to the joinder. IcL at 43 n.5. In sum, because a trial court 
would not have found the probative value of each robbery outweighed by its prejudicial 
dark hair, dark eyes, wearing . . . a blue and green jacket" before he heard another 
broadcast identifying the Camaro used in the second robbery (R. 274, 280-84, 362-63). 
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effect, trial counsel was, again, not ineffective in not moving to sever the Top Stop and 
Pizza Hut robberies. 
C. Absent the Joinder. There is No Reasonable Probability 
that a Different Result would have Occurred. 
Defendant argues that even the identifications by Paul Harbrecht, Kurt Anderson 
and Jesse Baldwin were suspect and thus there would have been a different outcome 
had the robberies been tried separately. App. Br. at 42-43. As discussed in Point IA2, 
Harbrecht's, Anderson's, and Baldwin's identification were strong, corroborated and 
supported by compelling circumstantial evidence (R. 268-72, 274, 290, 293, 301-02, 
304-5, 315-16, 317, 319-21, 328, 340, 347, 351, 360, 363, 418, State's Ex. 3). In 
sum, given the strength of the identifications in each store robbery, coupled with the 
circumstantial evidence in each case, there is no reasonable likelihood that the outcome -
of each trial would have been different if the robberies of the two stores had been tried 
separately. 
POINT IV - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT ASKING 
FOR A LIMITING INSTRUCTION 
At trial, defense counsel moved to strike as hearsay Officer Findlay's testimony 
that a blue 477 or '78 Camaro was seen arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut at the time 
of the robbery (R. 380, 389-90). The trial court denied the motion, finding that the 
testimony was offered to explain why Officer Cole was looking for a car of that 
description (R. 391-92). Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
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failing to request a limiting instruction, pursuant to rule 105, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
instructing the jury that Officer Findlay's testimony could not be used substantively. 
However, as argued below, defendant fails to show that counsel did not make a 
reasonable tactical decision in not requesting the instruction or that a limiting 
instruction would likely have resulted in a more favorable outcome. 
A. Defendant Fails to Overcome the Presumption that Counsel's Failure to 
Request a Limiting Instruction was Reasonable Trial Strategy, 
Defendant's assertion, that "an acceptable tactical reason for not attempting to 
limit the jury's use of this damaging testimony does not exist," see App. Br. at 44 fn. 
20, ignores the fact that substantive portions of Officer Findlay's hearsay testimony had 
already been heard by the jury in the prior, unobjected-to testimonies of several 
witnesses.22 Specifically, Harbrecht testified that the car was a gold-colored mid-80?s 
Camaro (R. 271-72). Officer Jones testified that Harbrecht told her it was a brown or 
tan '70's model Camaro, though he could not see the color well because of the lighting, 
but that "[t]he description of the vehicle in that ATL [Pizza Hut] . . . was similar if not 
exact to the description that I had just received from the complaint/vie dm [Harbrecht]" 
(R.280, 288). Officer Cole testified that "[s]hortly after I arrived [at the Pizza Hut] 
there was an update that the suspect may be in a '78 or late '70s model Chevrolet 
Camaro, blue in color," and that "[t]he description that was given to me [by Officer 
22
 The witnesses' testimony and the court's ruling are attached at Addendum E. 
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Jones] was late '70s or early '80s Chevy Camaro" (R. 363, 376). Thus, prior to 
Officer Findlay's testimony, three witnesses effectively informed or allowed the jury to 
infer that the car involved in both robberies was a late '70s or early or mid '80s model 
Chevrolet Camaro whose color might be gold, tan, brown, or blue. 
Although the fact of a car's arriving at the Pizza Hut just before the robbery and 
leaving just after the robbery was not part of any prior testimony, trial counsel may not 
have felt a limiting instruction important, given that a substantial portion of Officer 
Findlay's subsequent hearsay testimony was already in the record substantively. See 
State v. Bowman. 945 P.2d 153, 157 (Utah App. 1997) (failure to give limiting 
instruction not abuse of discretion where statements "admitted for impeachment 
purposes, [] had also previously been admitted in the State's substantive case-in-chief 
without objection"); cf State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App. 1992) (hearsay 
testimony was not so prejudicial as to require mistrial where same evidence was later 
admitted without objection). Indeed, trial counsel might reasonably have believed that 
a limiting instruction would only further focus attention on the nexus between the Pizza 
Hut robbery and the identification of defendant's car. See State v. Colonna. 766 P.2d 
1062, 1066 (Utah 1988)(although hearsay and character testimony was inadmissible, "it 
is conceivable that counsel made a deliberate and wise tactical choice in not focusing 
jury attention on them by objecting"); Utah R. Evid. 105 advisory committee note 
("This rule is to be read in conjunction with . . . [§ 77-8a-l] concerning severance, and 
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with the caveat that a limiting instruction may be illusory at b e s t . . . . " ) . 
In sum, trial counsel's tactical decision to forego a limiting instruction was 
reasonable trial strategy, considering it was sensible to believe that such an instruction 
might actually harm rather than assist defendant. 
B. Even had a Limiting Instruction Been Given, it is Unlikely 
To Have Created a More Favorable Outcome at Trial, 
Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by not having an instruction to limit the 
jury's possible substantive use of double hearsay, which use the prosecutor developed 
in closing. However, as discussed at Point IVA, above, and based on the testimonies 
of Harbrecht and Officers Jones and Cole, and entirely apart from Officer Findlay's 
testimony, the jury already had a substantial and legitimate basis to infer that a blue, 
late 70s Chevrolet Camaro was used in the Pizza Hut robbery. It is unchallenged that 
defendant was stopped moments after the Pizza Hut robbery in his blue 1978 Chevrolet 
Camaro (R. 363, 367, 418). Thus, a limiting instruction directing the jury not to use 
substantively Officer Findlay's testimony about the movements of a blue 1978 
Chevrolet Camaro just before and after the Pizza Hut robbery would have had little 
effect on the jury. 
Defendant incorrectly asserts that the prosecutor improperly made substantive 
use of the hearsay testimony when he referred in closing argument to Officer's 
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Findlay's testimony.23 App. Br. at 45. The quoted portion of the prosecutor's closing 
argument clearly refers not to Officer Findlay's testimony about the particularly 
described car arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut, but rather to the description Officer 
Cole received from Officer Jones concerning the Top Stop robbery, a "late '70s or 
early '80s, Chevy Camaro, brown in color." (R. 376). This is "the vehicle that 
resembles the vehicle that's been described, late '70s Camaro, a little difference in 
color, lighting does some strange things with color, doesn't it?" (R. 514) (emphasis 
added by def., App. Br. at 45). If the prosecutor was referring to Officer Findlay's 
testimony, he would have referenced a blue car arriving and leaving the Pizza Hut. 
Instead, he immediately sought to lead the jury to the same inference, that the Camaro 
had just been used in the Pizza Hut robbery, conscientiously using the less probative 
but legitimate fact that Officer Cole found the Camaro's hood warm (R. 514). 
In sum, based on the reasonable inferences the jury could properly make about 
In closing, the prosecutor argued: 
8:00 where was he? He was at the Top Stop. 8:30 where was he? 
He was at Pizza Hut. How do you know? Officer Cole comes up, sees 
the vehicle that resembles the vehicle that's been described, late '70s 
Camaro a little difference in color, lighting does strange things with 
color, doesn't it? It really does some strange things with color. 
What did he do, he feels the hood of the vehicle and it's warm. Is 
that the vehicle that's been parked there from 5:00 or 5:30? 
(R. 513-14). 
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the car used in the Pizza Hut robbery, the strength of the eyewitness identifications at 
both robbery sites, and the additional compelling evidence of guilt, there is little 
likelihood that a limiting instruction would have resulted in a more favorable result. 
POINT V - DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT 
MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE COUNTS II AND VIII WHERE 
DEFENDANT INTENDED TO ROB BOTH THE PIZZA HUT 
AND JESSE BALDWIN 
Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to consolidate 
Counts II and VIII of the second amended information because as to both counts the 
robber engaged in "precisely the same conduct of robbing Jesse." App. Br. at 48.24 
Defendant correctly cites the "intention" test reiterated in State v. Crosby to determine 
if multiple counts constitute a single offense: "[T]he general test as to whether there are 
separate offenses or one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or 
discloses separate and distinct intents." 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996) (quoting State 
v. KimbeL 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980)). Under this test, however, defendant was 
correctly charged with two separate counts of aggravated robbery as he intended to rob 
both the Pizza Hut and Jesse Baldwin, personally. 
It is undisputed that when defendant entered the Pizza Hut, he ordered 
24
 In contravention of the record, defendant states that the allegations of Counts 
II and VIII (Second Amended Information, R. 55-59, attached at Addendum F) are 
"identical." App. Br. at 46. In fact, those counts and the relevant instructions (R. 82, 
89, attached at Addendum G), clearly indicate that defendant was charged with robbery 
of the Pizza Hut property from Baldwin's presence (Count II) and robbery of Baldwin's 
property from his presence (Count VIII). 
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Anderson and then Baldwin to first empty out the register and then get the money from 
the safe (R. 295-297, 307-11). Only after he became impatient waiting for the safe to 
open did defendant demand money from Baldwin and others in the restaurant (R. 311-
14). It is clear that defendant's intention was to first rob the Pizza Hut and then to rob 
the individuals in the Pizza Hut. 
In contradistinction, this Court in Crosby found that the embezzler had the single 
intention of embezzling money from her employer even though she utilized different 
methods to accomplish the embezzlement. 927 P.2d at 645-646. Likewise, the court 
in State v. McQueen. 582 P.2d 251, 260 (1978), relied on by defendant, see App. Br. 
at 48-49, relied on a single-minded intent to rob. See State v. Stoops. 603 P.2d 221, 
228 (Kan. App. 1979)(explaining the result in McQueen, where "the defendant had no 
way of knowing that the revolver personally belonged to the employee and thus he had 
no criminal intent separate and apart from his intent to rob the store).25 
While ownership of the property stolen is not an element of Utah's robbery 
statutes, intention is an element. The evidence clearly shows that defendant had distinct 
25
 See also McKinlev v. State. 400 N.E.2d 1378, 1379 (Ind. 1980)(robbery of 
pharmacist's personal belongings separate offense from robbery of money from 
pharmacy); United States v. Diggs. 522 F.2d 1310, 1323 (D.C. Cir 1975) (affirming 
two robbery convictions from store and store employee), cert, denied. Floyd v. United 
States. 429 U.S. 852 (1976); Lash v. State. 433 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Ind. 1982) (two 
robbery convictions affirmed). But see Mansfield v. Champion. 992 F.2d 1098, 1100-
02 (10th Cir. 1993) (focusing on question of ownership rather than intent, held one 
count of robbery when personal and business property taken from one victim). 
Mansfield, however, was based on a double jeopardy claim, not urged in this case. 
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and separate intents to rob both the Pizza Hut and later Baldwin and others in the 
restaurant. Thus, defendant was properly convicted under counts II and VIII of two 
distinct robberies "from the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin". 
POINT VI - CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [the reviewing court] will reverse only if 
fthe cumulative effect of the several [otherwise harmless] errors undermines our 
confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.f" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 
1993). Because it is improbable that any identifications would have been suppressed 
or that the strongest would have been undermined by an cautionary instruction, or that 
the identifications would have been excluded if the Top Stop and Pizza Hut robberies 
were tried separately, or that an instruction limiting use of evidence already 
substantially before the jury would have had any effect on the outcome, the cumulative 
error doctrine has no application to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that 
defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A _ day of May, 1998. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 





(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in 
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his 
will, accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. (1978) ( repea led) 
77-21^31. Criminal joinder — Offenses and defendants.—(1) Two or 
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a^  
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies* 
JOT misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based 
on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions con* 
nected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. 
(2) * Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment 
or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an 
"offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts 
together'or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged 'in 
each count. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, 
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; excep-
tions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
ADDENDUM B 
METRO JAIL DIVISION 
LINEUP REQUEST FORM 
"E /TIME OF REQUEST : 03/13/95 1500 
iUESTOR : Sherry 
R) : LDA 
)SECUTING ATTORNEY : Roger Blaylock 
JFIRMED (DATE / TIME) : 05/09/95 1300 
ENSE ATTORNEY : Steven Johnston 
JFIRMED (DATE /TIME) : 05/08/95 1500 
IER ATTORNEY : 
JFIRMED (DATE / TIME) : 
IPECT : Maestas, Gino 
>.#) : 130714 
^RGE(S) : Agg. Robbery 1st. Deg. 
"E OF OFFENSE : 02/20/95 
r
 FILE NAME : Maestas.lup 
DATE /TIME OF LINEUP : 05/09/95 1300 
DATE / TIME OF FINAL I.D. : In Jail 
POLICE AGENCY INVOLVED : SLCPD 
POLICE CASE NUMBER : 
COURT DOCUMENT # : 951003291 
JUDGE : Hutchings 
PRIOR CANCELLATIONS 








PARTICIPANT NAME & S.O. NUMBER 
Maestas, Gino #130714 
Gonzales, Dereck #198165 
Giron, Angelo #135392 
Adkins, Andrew #174023 
Leon, Richard #189756 
Duran, Steven #174260 
Medina, Rogers #166495 










































































PARTICIPANT NAME & S.O. NUMBER D.O.B. RACE AGE HGT WGT HAIR EYES CELL |l 
WITNESS VOTING 
1 2 3 4 5 Officer Kirk Young / Jail Lineup Coordinator 

Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
Date: 5-0**25" Case #: 
Signature: ^ / ^ / — J f a t U f t ^ E l 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
j 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
:
 ^/y//*^ase #: Date 
Signature? 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
H 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
Date: C-^'*[$ Case #: 
Signature: 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
^ 
w 
^ " w 1 * * 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
Date: 7-9-?*?- Case #: 
Signature: •Ml^^te*^ 
If you ^fecognizcrany person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
7 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
Date: SrCl'C\tb Case #: 
Signature: U A J Q ft l A M A f f S 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
(o 
Salt Lake County Metro Jail 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
v S i f / ^ ^ C a s e ft: / 
Signature: C fWtd&L otfc^/j/sVitfi--
Date 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
their number on the back. 
Salt Lake County Metro jau 
Lineup Identification Instructions 
Date: Case #: 
Signature: / f W H^^O 
If you recognize any person present in this 
lineup as the individual involved in the crime, please 
indicate by marking their number in the square below. 
If you do not recognize any person 
participating in this lineup as the individual involved in 
the crime, mark a zero in the square. 
If you are not sure, but think you recognize any 
person participating in this lineup as the individual 
involved in the crime, leave the square blank and mark 
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STATE v. LONG Utah 4 
Cite as 721 PJd 483 (Utah 1986) 
uments of Division of Corrections, or t 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff parole officer was their official or dep 
and Respondent, custodian. Rules of Evid., Rule 68(1). 
v. 3. Criminal Law <s=>921 
Defendant would be entitled to E 
trial on charge of possession of dangen 
weapon by restricted person where pr 
of prior felony convictions at trial \ 
based on admission of unauthenticated c 
uments. Rules of Evid., Rule 63(17) 
4. Criminal Law <S=>772(1) 
Defendant charged with aggrava 
assault was entitled to cautionary instr 
tion regarding eyewitness identificati 
where victim had observed assailant 
brief time from back or side while be 
shot and had failed to identify defendant 
photographic array shortly after shooti 
identifications resulted from suggest 
court room proceedings rather than fori 
lineups, and victim's description of ass 
ant's clothing did not match that worn 
defendant at time he was apprehend 
5. Criminal Law «=»772(1) 
Trial courts must give cautionary 
struction whenever eyewitness identifi 
tion is central issue in case and that 
struction is requested by defense; ato 
doning State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d l 
(Utah); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 15 
(Utah); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d S 
(Utah); State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
(Utah); and State v. Schaffer, 638 P 
1185. 
6. Criminal Law <a=>785(3) 
Proper cautionary instruction on e 
witness testimony should sensitize jury 
factors that empirical research have sho 
to be of importance in determining accu 
cy of eyewitness identifications, especia 
those that laypersons most likely would i 
appreciate, and include not only the ext 
nals, like quality of lighting and time av; 
able for observation, but also internal 
subjective factors, such as likelihood of 
curate perception, storage and retrieval 
information by witness. 
7. Criminal Law <a=»785(3) 
Cautionary instruction on eyewitn* 
identification should address the opportu 
ty of witness to view the actor during t 
event; witness' degree of attention to t 
actor at the time of the event; witne: 
canacitv to observe the event, includi 
Anthony L. LONG, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 19354. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 20, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., of aggravated assault and pos-
session of a dangerous weapon by a re-
stricted person, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) 
defendant was not unfairly surprised by 
admission of documents relating to prior 
felony arrest; (2) copies of documents were 
not adequately authenticated, and defend-
ant was entitled to new trial on charge of 
possession of dangerous weapon by re-
stricted person; (3) defendant was entitled 
to cautionary instruction regarding eye-
witness identification; (4) trial courts 
would be required to give cautionary in-
struction in future; and (5) defendant 
would be entitled to granting of timely 
motion for severance of charges on re-
mand. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, CJ., and Howe, J., concurred in 
part and dissented in part and filed opin-
ions. 
1. Criminal Law «=>663 
Defendant was not unfairly surprised 
by prosecution's failure to deliver copies of 
documents relating to prior felony convic-
tions, where defense counsel knew that 
proof of at least one of those convictions 
would be introduced at trial and had made 
detailed and capable objection to introduc-
tion of those documents. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 64. 
2. Criminal Law <s=»444 
Copies of documents relating to de-
fendant's prior felony convictions were not 
adequately authenticated for purposes of 
official-records exception to hearsay rule, 
in ahcmino nf ovHHpnrp as to hnw rnnips ornt 
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made spontaneously and remained consist-
ent thereafter or was the product of sug-
gestion; and the nature of the event being 
observed and likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it cor-
rectly. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>620(6) 
Defendant charged with aggravated 
assault and possession of dangerous weap-
on by restricted person would be entitled to 
granting of timely motion for severance of 
those charges on remand. U.C.A.1953, 77-
35-9. 
Karen Jennings, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Dave B. 
Thompson, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Anthony L. Long was convict-
ed of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, and possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony. Before this Court, Long 
claims error in the authentication of doc-
uments evidencing his earlier felony convic-
tions, the refusal to sever trial of the two 
charges, and the refusal to give cautionary 
instructions about the eyewitness identifi-
cation. We reverse and remand for a new 
trial. 
On the evening of March 1, 1983, just 
after dark, Joe Rocha was approaching the 
front door of his home in Salt Lake City 
when he heard footsteps behind him and a 
voice say, "Don't move or I will blow your 
head off." He felt something cold and 
metallic on the back of his head. The voice 
ordered Rocha onto the front porch of his 
house and up against the wall next to the 
door. He faced the wall, unable to see his 
assailant. His girlfriend opened the door 
and stepped out of the house. She saw a 
black man holding a gun to Rocha's head 
and another black man coming toward the 
house. She ran inside, closed the door, and 
told Rocha's son, Jacob, what she had seen. 
She then called the police. 
Meanwhile, Jacob took a .357 magnum 
revolver from a desk drawer and went to 
the front door. As he started to open the 
door, it was kicked in from the outside. A 
sawed-off shotgun was fired into the 
house. Jacob was hit and thrown back into 
the room. He fired a shot in return. Ja-
cob testified that he saw the face of his 
assailant for about six seconds, during 
which he was crying and his vision was 
"glossy." 
Joe Rocha testified that after the shots 
were fired he saw two men running away 
from the house. One of Joe Rocha's neigh-
bors testified that he heard two shots fired. 
He went outside, saw a person approaching 
a bronze or tan Oldsmobile Cutlass or Se-
ville with its motor running, and heard 
someone say, "Jessie, let's go." The per-
son got in the passenger side of the car and 
it drove off. 
Robin Lee, an acquaintance of defendant 
Long's, testified that she was with Long 
and Jessie Hobsun on the evening of March 
1st, that they had parked their car in an 
alley, and that Long and Hobsun had then 
left the car. Hobsun returned shortly, got 
in the car, and told Lee to drive away. 
Long then approached the car and got in 
the back seat. He was wounded. Soon 
after, the three became involved in a high 
speed chase with the police. When they 
were finally stopped, all three were arrest-
ed. The arresting officers saw that Long 
had a large blotch of red on his shirt in the 
abdomen area. Long's coat had two bullet 
holes in it, one in the back where the bullet 
had entered and another high under the 
arm where it had come out. 
Three days later, while Jacob Rocha was 
still in the hospital and on medication, a 
detective presented him with a photo array 
and asked him to identify his assailant. 
The photo array included a picture of Long. 
Jacob did not pick defendant Long's photo 
from the array. However, he did select 
two other photos, one of which was of 
Hobsun. 
At trial, Jacob identified Long in person 
as the man who shot him, as he had previ-
ously done at two face-to-face encounters 
during preliminary hearings where Long 
was clearly identified. On cross-examina-
tion, however, Jacob did not recall being 
unable to pick Long's picture from the ini-
tial photo array. At the close of trial, 
Long's counsel requested cautionary in-
structions, patterned after those suggested 
in United States v. Tel/aire, 469 F.2d 552 
(D.C.Cir.1972), regarding Jacob's eye-
witness identification. The court refused 
the instructions. Long was found guilty of 
aggravated assault and possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
This appeal followed. 
STATE v. LONG 
Cite as 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 
Utah i 
Long first challenges his conviction of 
possessing a dangerous weapon on the 
ground that the documents used to prove 
that he was a convicted felon were not 
properly authenticated. The charge of pos-
session of a dangerous weapon by a re-
stricted person involves three elements: (1) 
possession of a dangerous weapon (2) by an 
individual who is on parole (3) from a felo-
ny conviction. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-10-
503(2) (Repl.Vol. 8B, 1978). To establish 
that Long was a convicted felon, his Utah 
parole officer, Flint Mollner, was called as 
a witness. Through Mollner, the State of-
fered into evidence copies of certified cop-
ies of documents from the Davis County 
clerk's office showing that Long had been 
twice convicted of felonies. The certified 
copies from which the copies introduced 
into evidence had been made were part of 
Mollner's parole file on Long. Long's 
counsel unsuccessfully objected to the ad-
mission of the copies of the certified copies 
in Mollner's files on the grounds that they 
were hearsay and were not within any of 
the exceptions in the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence. On appeal, Long renews the argu-
ment made below. 
The copies were admitted under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 63(17)(a), the official 
records exception to the hearsay rule.1 
Under this provision, the content of an 
official record is admissible to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted if the require-
ments of both Rule 64 and Rule 68 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence are met. Long 
argues that the prosecutor did not deliver 
copies of the documents to opposing coun-
sel within a reasonable time before trial, as 
required by Rule 64, and that the copies 
were not adequately authenticated, as re-
quired by Rule 68(1). 
[1] Long's Rule 64 argument is without 
merit. Rule 64 specifically provides that 
even if a copy of the document sought to 
be admitted is not delivered to opposing 
counsel within a reasonable time before 
trial, it still may be admitted if "the judge 
1. At the time of Long's trial, Rules 63(17), 64 
and 68 of the Utah Rules of Evidence were still 
in effect. These rules have since been supersed-
finds that [the] adverse party has not t 
unfairly surprised by the failure to del 
such copy." The lower court's finding 1 
there was no unfair surprise is suppoi 
by the facts. The documents related < 
to prior felony convictions, and Long 
his counsel certainly knew that proof o 
least one such conviction would be ir 
duced at trial. Moreover, defense c< 
sel's detailed and capably presented ol 
tion to the exhibit at trial belies any cl 
of unfair surprise. We find no abusi 
discretion in the court's ruling. 
There is merit, however, to Long's ] 
68(1) argument. That rule states: "Ar 
ficial record . . . may be evidenced . . . 1 
copy attested by the officer having 
legal custody of the record, or by his d 
ty, and . . . accompanied with a certifi 
that such officer has the custody." I 
argues that Mollner was not "the ofi 
having the legal custody of the rec< 
because the originals of the document 
issue were official records of the W< 
County clerk's office, not of the Utah A 
Probation and Parole section. The cei 
cation of a Utah parole officer, there! 
could not suffice to bring the copies wi 
the ambit of Rule 68(1) or, consequei 
Rule 63(17). Mollner had only copies 
copies that had been certified by the W< 
County clerk and was in no positioi 
testify that the copies in his posses 
were copies of originals because he 
never seen the originals. Long ass 
that to accept Mollner's authentic* 
would make the hearsay rule meaning 
in cases involving copies of official recc 
To support his position, Long relie; 
State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (1 
1980). In that case, the defendant was 
charged with possession of a dange 
weapon by a restricted person. A pj 
officer introduced copies of court rec< 
certified only by a notary public, to s 
the defendant's prior felony convict 
Because the certification was execute 
someone who neither had legal custod 
ed by scattered provisions in the new 
Rules of Evidence, which became effective 
tember 1, 1983. 
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the records nor was a deputy of the legal 
custodian, this Court held that the authenti-
cation was inadequate under Rule 68(1) and 
ordered a new trial. 
The State seeks to distinguish Lamorie. 
It argues that in Lamorie the person certi-
fying the copies of the judgment of convic-
tion was only a notary public and not the 
custodian of the court records. In con-
trast, Mollner, who certified the copies, was 
legal custodian of Long's parole file. 
Therefore, the State asserts that as an 
official record of the Adult Probation and 
Parole section of the Division of Correc-
tions, the contents of the file were admissi-
ble. In making this argument, the State 
relies on People v. Howard, 72 Cal.App. 
561, 237 P. 780 (1925). Our reading of 
Howard, however, leads us to the opposite 
conclusion. 
In Howard, the prosecution also attempt-
ed to prove the fact of a prior felony con-
riction by introducing a copy of a certified 
opy of a judgment and commitment to 
tate prison. The original document was 
ertified by the clerk of the court entering 
he judgment of conviction. The copy of 
his document was accompanied by a doc-
ment executed by the warden of San 
juentin and impressed with the state pris-
n seal certifying that the introduced copy 
ras a "true and correct" copy of the de-
endant's commitment papers. The Cali-
Drnia Supreme Court upheld the admission 
f the copy into evidence, stating that when 
certified copy of a judgment of conviction 
delivered with a convict to the state 
rison warden, as required by statute, that 
>py becomes an official document of the 
ate prison, and a certified copy of the 
>py, authenticated by the warden, is ad-
issible into evidence. Id. 237 P. at 781. 
[2] In the case before us, the copies 
troduced into evidence were analogous to 
ose introduced in Howard. Under How-
*d, certification by the Utah state prison 
arden that the copies were copies of offi-
al documents of the Department of Cor-
ctions and that he was their custodian 
3uld have been sufficient to permit their 
warden, is statutorily mandated to take 
possession of the documents when a prison-
er is delivered to him for incarceration. 
See U.C.A., 1953, § 64-13-23 (2d Repl. Vol. 
7A, 1978); § 77-19-2 (Repl. Vol. 8C, 1982). 
However, Mollner, not the Utah state pris-
on warden, certified the copies. There is 
no evidence to show how the copies got in 
Mollner's file, that the copies in Mollner's 
file constituted official documents of the 
Division of Corrections, or that Mollner 
was their official custodian or deputy cus-
todian. Absent this evidence, there is no 
basis in this case for applying the Howard 
rationale. 
The State urges us to extend the How-
ard holding, in effect arguing that because 
the warden supervises the state prison, 
which is under the jurisdiction of the State 
Division of Corrections, and because the 
warden could be an official custodian of 
copies of judgments of conviction, any oth-
er branch of the Division of Corrections, 
including Adult Probation and Parole, 
should also have authority to authenticate 
copies of judgments. We decline the invi-
tation. 
The hearsay rule has as its declared pur-
pose the exclusion of evidence not subject 
to cross-examination concerning the truth-
fulness of the matters asserted. J. Wig-
more, Evidence § 1362 (Chadbourn rev. 
1974). The exceptions to the rule have 
evolved to permit the admission of evidence 
that is deemed reliable notwithstanding its 
failure to satisfy the hearsay rule. Id. at 
§ 1420; cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 107, 54 S.Ct 330, 332, 78 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1934); United States v. Adams, 446 
P.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir.1971); Kehm v. Proc-
ter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 724 
F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir.1983). In the 
present case, the pertinent exception has 
not been satisfied, and we decline to broad-
en it because to do so would permit evi-
dence to be admitted without any assur-
ance as to the truth of the matters assert-
ed. The State's position would open the 
door to the admission nf anv /lrw»n*«*»*»fe 
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so long as they wend their way into some 
state functionary's file. 
[3] Because the trial court erred in ad-
mitting the copies, the State is left without 
proof of one essential element of the first 
charge against Long—that Long had been 
previously convicted of a felony.2 As a 
result, a new trial is necessary on the 
charge of possession of a dangerous weap-
on by a restricted person. See State v. 
Lamorie, 610 P.2d at 346-47. 
Long next contends that his conviction 
for aggravated assault must be reversed 
because the trial court erred both in re-
fusing to give a requested jury instruction 
concerning eyewitness identification and in 
refusing to instruct the jury that it could 
permissibly find that he was merely 
present at the scene of the crime. These 
instructions together covered Long's theo-
ry of the case, i.e., that Jacob did not 
clearly identify Long as the individual who 
fired the shot and that Long may have 
been merely present when the crime was 
committed. 
The requested cautionary instructions re-
garding eyewitness identification were pat-
terned on those suggested in United States 
v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. We have 
previously said that whether such instruc-
tions must be given in a particular case is a 
matter left largely to the discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 
316 (Utah 1985); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 
1251, 1252 (Utah 1984); State v. Newton, 
681 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61-62 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 1187 
(Utah 1981). We have also indicated that 
the failure to give such an instruction may 
constitute an abuse of discretion when the 
circumstances surrounding the eyewitness 
identification raise serious questions of reli-
ability. See, e.g., State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 
at 1253-54. However, as both counsel not-
ed at oral argument in this case, although 
2. Mollner's testimony that he supervised Long 
on parole is proof of that fact only. It cannot 
be inferred from that fact alone that the convic-
tion was for a felony. Because the Board of 
we have reviewed many cases in which t 
trial court refused to give a cautions 
instruction, we have never reversed a o 
viction for that reason. We also have be 
advised that this Court's de facto failure 
ever require such an instruction has rest 
ed in trial courts rarely, if ever, givi 
cautionary instructions. In a recent a 
raising the identical issue, the State si 
gested at oral argument that this Coi 
either abandon any pretext of requiring 
cautionary eyewitness instruction or ma 
the requirement meaningful. State 
Quevedo, No. 19049, argued November 
1985. We have decided to follow the latl 
course, adopting the approach earlier art 
ulated by Justice Stewart in his dissent 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 62-66. 
[4] On the facts of this case, it w 
plainly improper under Schaffer and 
progeny for the trial court not to ha 
given a cautionary instruction. The Stat* 
case hinged on the uncorroborated e] 
witness testimony of a single witness—t 
victim of the crime. The circumstanc 
surrounding his identification raised gra 
concerns about its reliability. Jacob Roc 
had an opportunity to view the face of 1 
assailant for approximately sue secon 
during the assault At the same time 
was identifying his assailant, he was sh< 
was thrown back against the wall by t 
force of the blast, returned the fire, a 
experienced "glossy" vision. During t 
rest of the thirty or so seconds of obser 
tion, Rocha could see only the back or si 
of his assailant as he stood in the darknc 
outside the front door of Rocha's houi 
Further, Rocha failed to identify defends 
from a six-photo array presented to h 
three days after the shooting; interestii 
ly, he did select a photo of Jessie Hobsun 
man who was with defendant on the nig 
of the crime but was not prosecuted. I 
cha identified Long at trial and at ft 
preliminary hearings; however, the recc 
indicates that these identifications to 
ted to county jails as well as to state prisons 
is possible that Long might have been on pan 
as the result of a misdemeanor conviction, i 
U.C.A.. 1953, § 77-27-11 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 19 
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place not in formal lineups, but in court-
room proceedings during which Long was 
apparently the only black man present. Fi-
nally, a significant discrepancy exists be-
tween the victim's description of his assail-
ant's clothing and the clothing Long was 
actually wearing when police stopped the 
car in which he was riding.3 
Considering the matters more generical-
ly, the circumstances surrounding Rocha's 
identification highlight the questionable 
wisdom of allowing the uncorroborated 
identification testimony of one eyewitness 
to serve as the linchpin of the prosecution's 
case, at least in the absence of an instruc-
tion to the jury focusing its attention on 
the well-documented factors that affect the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications. 
See F. Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive 
You? Expert Psychological Testimony 
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identi-
fication, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969 (1977); J. Bibi-
coff, Seeing is Believing? The Need for 
Cautionary Jury Instructions on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification 
Testimony, 11 San Fernando Valley L.Rev. 
95 (1983); R. Sanders, Helping the Jury 
Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The 
Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am J. 
Crim.Law 189 (1984). The literature is re-
plete with empirical studies documenting 
the unreliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion. See generally P. Wall, Eyewitness 
Identification in Criminal Cases (1965); 
E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979). 
There is no significant division of opinion 
on the issue. The studies all lead inexora-
bly to the conclusion that human perception 
is inexact and that human memory is both 
limited and fallible. We therefore have 
concluded that a more rigorous approach to 
jautionary instructions than this court has 
heretofore followed is appropriate. See 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 62-66 
Stewart, J., dissenting). 
L It might be argued that the police officer's 
testimony that defendant was suffering from a 
bullet wound when his car was stopped corrob-
orates the identification of defendant as the 
victim's assailant However, two men partici-
pated in the incident, and nothing in the testi-
Some background is necessary. Anyone 
who stops to consider the matter will rec-
ognize that the process of perceiving 
events and remembering them is not as 
simple or as certain as turning on a camera 
and recording everything the camera sees 
on tape or film for later replay. What we 
perceive and remember is the result of a 
much more complex process, one that does 
not occur without involving the whole per-
son, and one that is profoundly affected by 
who we are and what we bring to the event 
of perception. See R. Buckhout, Eye-
witness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 
179 (1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific 
American 23 (Dec.1974)). 
Research on human memory has consist-
ently shown that failures may occur and 
inaccuracies creep in at any stage of what 
is broadly referred to as the "memory pro-
cess." This process includes the acquisi-
tion of information, its storage, and its 
retrieval and communication to others. 
These stages have all been extensively 
studied in recent years, and a wide variety 
of factors influencing each stage have been 
identified. See Loftus, supra, at chs. 3-5; 
Buckhout, supra, at 172-81. 
During the first or acquisition stage, a 
wide array of factors has been found to 
affect the accuracy of an individual's per-
ception. Some of these are rather obvious. 
For example, the circumstances of the ob-
servation are critical: the distance of the 
observer from the event, the length of time 
available to perceive the event, the amount 
of light available, and the amount of move-
ment involved. Buckhout, supra, at 173. 
However, perhaps the more important 
factors affecting the accuracy of one's per-
ception are those factors originating within 
the observer. One such limitation is the 
individual's physical condition, including 
both obvious infirmities as well as such 
factors as fatigue and drug or alcohol use. 
Another limitation which can affect percep-
mony suggests that the man wielding the shot-
gun, rather than the other man, was the one hit 
by Rocha's fire. Thus, the testimony going to 
defendant's wound can be fairly construed to 
indicate only that defendant was present at the 
scene of the crime. 
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tion is the emotional state of the observer. 
Contrary to much accepted lore, when an 
observer is experiencing a marked degree 
of stress, perceptual abilities are known to 
decrease significantly. See, e.g., Woocher, 
supra, at 979 n. 29. 
A far less obvious limitation of great 
importance arises from the fact that the 
human brain cannot receive and store all 
the stimuli simultaneously presented to it. 
This forces people to be selective in what 
they perceive of any given event. See 
Woocher, supra, at 976-77. To accomplish 
this selective perception successfully, over 
time each person develops unconscious 
strategies for determining what elements 
of an event are important enough to be 
selected out for perception. The rest of 
the stimuli created by the event are ig-
nored by the brain. These unconscious 
strategies of selective perception work 
quite well in our day-to-day lives to provide 
us with only the most commonly useful 
information, but the strategies may result 
in the exclusion of information that will 
later prove important in a court proceeding. 
For example, the significance of the event 
to the witness at the time of perception is 
very important. Buckhout, supra, at 172-
73. Thus, people usually remember with 
some detail and clarity their whereabouts 
at the time they learned of John F. Kenne-
dy's assassination. Those same people, 
however, are generally less accurate in 
their descriptions of people, places, and 
events encountered only recently in the 
course of their daily routines. For in-
stance, few of us can remember the color 
or make of the car that was in front of us 
at the last traffic signal where we waited 
for the light to turn green. An everyday 
situation such as this presents an excellent 
opportunity to observe, and yet, while such 
information may be a critical element in a 
criminal trial, our process of selective per-
ception usually screens out such data com-
pletely. To the extent that court proceed-
ings may focus on events that were not of 
particular importance to the observer at 
4. For a critique of this dominant line of re-
search and an alternate approach to applied 
eyewitness testimony research, see G. Wells, Ap~ 
the time they occurred, then, the obser 
may have absolutely no memory of 
facts simply because he or she failed 
select the critical information for perc 
tion.4 
Another mechanism we all develop 
compensate for our inability to perceive 
aspects of an event at once is a series 
logical inferences: if we see one thing, 
assume, based on our past experience, t 
we also saw another that ordinarily 
lows. This way we can "perceive" a wh 
event in our mind's eye when we hi 
actually seen or heard only portions of 
Id. at 980. The implications of this mei 
ry strategy for court proceedings are s 
ilar to those of selective perception. 
Other important factors that affect 
accuracy of a viewer's perception, i 
which are unique to each observer, inch 
the expectations, personal experiences, 
ases, and prejudices brought by any ii 
vidual to a given situation. Buckhout, 
pra, at 175-76. A good example of 
effect of preconceptions on the accurac) 
perception is the well-documented fact t 
identifications tend to be more accur 
where the person observing and the i 
being observed are of the same n 
Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony 
search: System Variables and Estima 
Variables, 36 J. Personality & So 
Psych. 1546, 1550 (1978); Note, Cross 
cial Identification Errors in Crimi 
Cases, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 934 (1984); E 
coff, supra, at 101. 
The memory process is also subject 
distortion in the second or retention sta 
when information that may or may 
have been accurately perceived is store< 
the memory. Research demonstrates t 
both the length of time between the 
ness's experience and the recollection 
that experience, and the occurrence of < 
er events in the intervening time per 
affect the accuracy and completeness 
recall. Just as in the perception ste 
plied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: Syi 
Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. Per 
ality and Soc. Psych. 1546 (1978). 
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where the mind infers what occurred from 
what was selected for perception, in the 
retention stage people tend to add extrane-
ous details and to fill in memory gaps over 
time, thereby unconsciously constructing 
more detailed, logical, and coherent recol-
lections of their actual experiences. Thus, 
as eyewitnesses wend their way through 
the criminal justice process, their reports of 
what was seen and heard tend to become 
"more accurate, more complete and less 
ambiguous" in appearance. Buckhout, su-
pra, at 179. The implications of this men-
tal strategy for any criminal defendant 
whose conviction hinges on an eyewitness 
identification are obvious. See Woocher, 
supra, at 983 n. 53. 
Research has also undermined the com-
mon notion that the confidence with which 
an individual makes an identification is a 
valid indicator of the accuracy of the recol-
lection. K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Ac-
curacy and Confidence: Can We Infer 
Anything About Their Relationship?, 4 
Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980); Lind-
say, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect 
Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy With-
in and Across Situations?, 66 J. Applied 
Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981); Bibicoff, supra, at 
L04 n. 35. In fact, the accuracy of an 
identification is, at times, inversely related 
to the confidence with which it is made. 
Buckhout, supra, at 184. 
Finally, the retrieval stage of the memo-
ry process—when the observer recalls the 
event and communicates that recollection 
bo others—is also fraught with potential 
for distortion. For example, language im-
poses limits on the observer. Experience 
suggests that few individuals have such a 
mastery of language that they will not 
lave some difficulty in communicating the 
letails and nuances of the original event, 
md the greater the inadequacy, the greater 
;he likelihood of miscommunication. An 
mtirely independent problem arises when 
>ne who has accurately communicated his 
•ecollection in a narrative form is then 
isked questions in an attempt to elicit a 
iiore complete picture of the event de-
scribed. Those asking such questions, by 
conscious questioning techniques, can sig-
nificantly influence what a witness "re-
members" in response to questioning. And 
as the witness is pressed for more details, 
his responses become increasingly inaccu-
rate. See Loftus, Reconstructing Memo-
ry: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15 Jurime-
trics J. 188 (1975). In addition, research 
has documented an entirely different set of 
no less significant problems that relate to 
the suggestiveness of police lineups, show-
ups, and photo arrays. See, e.g., Buckh-
out, supra, at 179-87. 
Although research has convincingly dem-
onstrated the weaknesses inherent in eye-
witness identification, jurors are, for the 
most part, unaware of these problems. 
People simply do not accurately understand 
the deleterious effects that certain varia-
bles can have on the accuracy of the memo-
ry processes of an honest eyewitness. See 
K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors 
Share a Common Understanding Con-
cerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 6 Law and 
Human Behavior 15 (1982); J. Brigham, R. 
Both well, The Ability of Prospective Ju-
rors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eye-
witness Identification, 7 Law and Human 
Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the common 
knowledge that people do possess often 
runs contrary to documented research find-
ings. See Loftus, supra, at 171-77. 
Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do 
not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness 
testimony that they give such testimony 
great weight See Sanders, supra, at 189-
90 n. 6; Loftus, supra, at 8-19. In one 
notable study involving a simulated crimi-
nal trial, 18% of the jurors voted to convict 
the defendant when there were no eye-
witnesses to the crime. However, when a 
credible eyewitness was presented, 72% 
voted to convict. And, surprisingly, even 
when presented with an eyewitness who 
was quite thoroughly discredited by coun-
sel, a full 68% still voted to convict. 15 
Jurimetrics J. at 189-90. In one study 
which found a poor relationship between 
witness confidence and accuracy of identifi-
cation, the researchers concluded, "[i]t is 
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around 80% irrespective of the actual rate 
of witness accuracy." G. Wells, R. Lind-
say, T. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, 
and Juror Perception in Eyewitness Iden-
tification, 64 J. Applied Psych. 440, 447 
(1979). 
The United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that "[t]he vagaries of eye-
witness identification are well-known; the 
annals of criminal law are rife with instanc-
es of mistaken identification." United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 
1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). That 
Court has long professed, .as a fundamental 
value of our democratic society, that "it is 
far worse to convict an innocent man than 
to let a guilty man go free." In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct 1068, 1076, 
25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Yet despite judicial recognition of 
the documented unreliability of eyewitness 
identification, courts have been slow both 
to accord the problem the attention it de-
serves and to fashion ways of minimizing 
its potentially unjust effects. The fault 
probably lies with the narrowness of the 
vision of most lawyers and judges. We 
tend to comfortably rely upon settled legal 
precedent and practice, especially when 
long-settled technical rules are concerned, 
and to largely ignore the teachings of other 
disciplines, especially when they contradict 
long-accepted legal notions. I.D. Stewart, 
Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A 
Criticism of Present Law and the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 
Utah L.Rev. 1, 38; see also B. Clifford, The 
Relevance of Psychological Investigation 
to Legal Issues in Testimony and Identifi-
cation, 1979 Crim.L.Rev. 153; State v 
Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236, 1241 
(1981). 
Even though the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized the fundamental 
problem posed by eyewitness testimony, its 
much-quoted articulation of how one should 
approach the evaluation of the credibility 
and admissibility of eyewitness identifica-
tion is a fair example of the lag between 
the assumptions embodied in the law and 
the findings of other disciplines. The 
[T]he factors to be considered in evalui 
ing the likelihood of misidentification i 
elude the opportunity of the witness 
view the criminal at the time of t 
crime, the witnesses] degree of att€ 
tion, the accuracy of the witnesses] pri 
description of the criminal, the level 
certainty demonstrated by the witness 
the confrontation, and the length of tii 
between the crime and the confrontatk 
Neil v. Riggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.( 
375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). A carei 
reading of this statement will show tr 
several of the criteria listed by the Coi 
are based on assumptions that are flai 
contradicted by well-respected and esse 
tially unchallenged empirical studies, x 
though the law will always lag behind t 
sciences to some degree because of t 
need for solid scientific consensus befc 
the law incorporates its teachings, we c< 
elude that in the area of eyewitness idei 
fication, the time has come for a mc 
empirically sound approach. 
Some have proposed a radical approa 
to the problems of eyewitness identifi 
tion. In Great Britain, for example, af 
two especially egregious instances of crii 
nal convictions based upon mistaken idei 
ty, a committee chaired by Lord Devlin v 
appointed to study the matter. See G. V 
Hams, Evidence of Identification: 1 
Devlin Report, Crim.L.R. 407 (1976). -
ter extensive work, the Devlin Commit 
recommended that trial judges should 
required to instruct juries that an unc 
roborated visual identification alone co 
not be a sufficient basis for convictinj 
defendant of a crime unless special circi 
stances were present Williams, supra, 
412-13. These special circumstances s 
gested by the Devlin Report were, in 
sence, factors which would bolster the I 
ability of the visual identification, rat 
than provide independent corroborating 
dence. Examples of such factors givei 
the Report include: (1) the witness's fai 
iarity with the identified suspect; (2) 
defendant's failure to deny he was a m 
ber of a small group, one member of wl 
- j -LL :_ 1 ZO\ i.U* A^te 
492 Utah 721 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ant's failure to counter the viewer's story. 
Id. 
Perhaps because the Devlin Report's rec-
ommendations departed so substantially 
from the traditional heavy reliance of the 
police and the judiciary on eyewitness iden-
tification, they do not appear to have been 
adopted. They have, nonetheless, received 
some recognition here. See United States 
v. Butter, 636 F.2d 727, 735 (D.C.Cir.1980) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting). While we, too, do 
not choose to modify the Utah common law 
as radically as the Devlin Report suggest-
ed, there is no question that credible evi-
dence supports that approach. Such a bold 
departure will have to await further empiri-
cal evidence that less radical alternatives 
do not ameliorate the problem. However, 
we do consider ourselves compelled by the 
overwhelming weight of the empirical re-
search to take steps to alleviate the diffi-
culties inherent in any use of eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
[5] We are convinced that, at a mini-
mum, additional judicial guidance to the 
jury in evaluating such testimony is war-
ranted. We therefore today abandon our 
discretionary approach to cautionary jury 
instructions and direct that in cases tried 
from this date forward, trial courts shall 
give such an instruction whenever eye-
witness identification is a central issue in a 
I case and such an instruction is requested 
by the defense. Given the great weight 
jurors are likely to give eyewitness testimo-
ny, and the deep and generally unperceived 
flaws in it, to convict a defendant on such 
evidence without advising the jury of the 
factors that should be considered in evalu-
ating it could well deny the defendant due 
process of law under article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
5. A cautionary instruction plainly is not a pana-
cea. See D. Starkman, The Use of Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 
Crim.L.Qtrly. 361, 375-77 (1978-79). The only 
study evaluating the Telfaire instruction that has 
come to our attention indicated that the model 
Telfaire instruction had little effect on jurors' 
sensitivity to the factors affecting the reliability 
of eyewitness identification. When the instruc-
It is true that some state courts have 
refused to give cautionary instructions on 
the ground that they constitute improper 
judicial comment on the evidence or sug-
gest the weight that should be accorded 
certain testimony. See Annot., 23 A.L. 
R.4th 1089, 1110-11 (1983). We see little 
merit to this argument. A well-constructed 
cautionary instruction will not permit a 
judge to opine as to the credibility of the 
testimony. It will only pinpoint identifica-
tion as a central issue and highlight the 
factors that bear on the reliability of that 
identification. This will do no more than 
apprise the jury of the inherent limitations 
of eyewitness identification. Such an in-
struction both "respectjs] the jury's func-
tion and strike[s] a reasonable balance be-
tween protecting the innocent and convict-
ing the guilty." Sanders, supra, at 204. 
The approach we adopt today offers a de-
fendant some protection from false convic-
tion, while ensuring the efficacy of the jury 
system by providing jurors with the knowl-
edge necessary for sound decision making.5 
[6,7] Having decided that cautionary in-
structions should be given rather routinely, 
the question is whether this court should 
adopt one specific instruction as the only 
acceptable formulation, or whether we 
should grant trial court and counsel some 
latitude in formulating instructions. We 
have decided to opt for the latter approach, 
at least until experience shows that confer-
ring such discretion on trial courts does not 
produce adequate instructions. To guide 
trial courts, we note that a proper instruc-
tion should sensitize the jury to the factors 
that empirical research have shown to be of 
importance in determining the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications, especially those 
that laypersons most likely would not ap-
preciate. These factors should include not 
only the externals, like the quality of the 
tion was coupled with a weak identification, 
however, it did produce less juror reliance on 
the eyewitness identification. Similarly, when 
it was given in conjunction with strong eye-
witness testimony, it bolstered jurors' beliefs in 
the correctness of the identification. See Sand-
ers, supra, at 212 n. 178 and at 217 n. 221. Full 
evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary instruc-
tions must await further experience. 
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lighting and the time available for observa-
tion, but also the internal or subjective 
factors, such as the likelihood of accurate 
perception, storage and retrieval of the in-
formation by a witness. For example, an 
instruction should address the following 
commonly accepted areas of concern: (1) 
the opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontane-
ously and remained consistent thereafter, 
or whether it was the product of sugges-
tion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the wit-
6. See. e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 
(D.C.Cir.1972); State v. Green, 86 NJ. 281, 430 
A.2d 914 (1981); Smith v. United States, 343 
A.2d 40 (D.C.App.1975); State v. Calia, 15 Or. 
App. 110, 514 P.2d 1354 (1973), cert, denied, 417 
U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 2621, 41 L.Ed.2d 222 (1974); 
People v. Guzman, 121 Cal.Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. 
App.3d 380 (1975); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 
385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981), and Annot., 23 A.L. 
R.4th 1070 (1983); see also R. Sanders, Helping 
the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The 
Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am J.Crim.L. 
189, 222-24 (1984). 
7. The instruction suggested by the Telfaire court 
reads as follows: 
One of the most important issues in this 
case is the identification of the defendant as 
the perpetrator of the crime. The Govern-
ment has the burden of [provingl identity, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential 
that the witness himself be free from doubt as 
to the correctness of his statement. However, 
you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the accuracy of the identifi-
cation of the defendant before you may con-
vict him. If you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of 
belief or impression by the witness. Its value 
depends on the opportunity the witness had to 
observe the offender at the time of the offense 
and to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of 
a witness, you should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had 
the capacity and an adequate opportunity to 
observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate op-
portunity to observe the offender at the time 
of the offense will be affected by such matters 
ness would perceive, remember and 
it correctly. This last area includes 
factors as whether the event was ai 
nary one in the mind of the observe 
ing the time it was observed, and w1 
the race of the actor was the same 
observer's. 
We have found numerous examp 
cautionary instructions.6 Many a 
short and superficial as to be of little 
in accomplishing our objectives. On 
seems to satisfy most of the legi 
concerns about eyewitness identifica 
that set forth in Telfaire and cite< 
approval by Justice Stewart in his c 
in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 
(Utah 1982).7 However, a critical ex; 
as how long or short a time was av 
how far or close the witness was, ho1 
were lighting conditions, whether the 
had had occasion to see or know the 
in the past. 
[In general, a witness bases any ide 
tion he makes on his perception throi 
use of his senses. Usually the witness 
fies an offender by the sense of sight—1 
is not necessarily so, and he may us 
senses.J 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identii 
made by the witness subsequent to the 
was the product of his own recollectioi 
may take into account both the strengt 
identification, and the circumstances 
which the identification was made. 
If the identification by the witne 
have been influenced by the circum 
under which the defendant was prese 
him for identification, you should sc 
the identification with great care. Y< 
also consider the length of time that 
between the occurrence of the crime 
next opportunity of the witness to see 
ant, as a factor bearing on the relial 
the identification. 
[You may also take into account 
identification made by picking the de 
out of a group of similar individuals i 
ally more reliable than one which 
from the presentation of the defendai 
to the witness.] 
[ (3) You [may] take into account ai 
sions in which the witness failed to n 
identification of defendant, or made ai 
fication that was inconsistent with his 
cation at trial.] 
(4) Finally, you must consider the c 
ty of each identification witness in tl 
way as any other witness, consider ' 
he is truthful, and consider whether 
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tion of the Telfaire instruction, proposed in 
1972, reveals that it does not cover several 
factors which more recent empirical re-
search have shown to be important, such as 
the limitations in our ability to perceive, 
store and retrieve information. It also in-
corporates some of the fallacious assump-
tions expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Neil v. Biggers. (See pp. 491-492, su-
pra.) Be that as it may, the Telfaire in-
struction would seem to suffice as an ade-
quate cautionary instruction under most 
the capacity and opportunity to make a reli-
able observation on the matter covered in his 
testimony. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proof 
on the prosecutor extends to every element of 
the crime charged, and this specifically in-
cludes the burden of proving beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the identity of the defendant as 
the perpetrator of the crime with which he 
stands charged. If after examining the testi-
mony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the 
accuracy of the identification, you must find 
the defendant not guilty. 
469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C.Cir.1972). (Bracket-
ed portions are optional, depending upon specif-
ic facts and circumstances of the case.) 
K. The proposed instruction reads: 
One of the most important questions [The 
only important question] in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the person 
who committed the crime. The prosecution 
has the burden of proving beyond a reason-
able doubt, not only that the crime was com-
mitted, but also that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime. If, after 
considering the evidence you have heard from 
both sides, you are not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have 
heard was an expression of belief or impres-
sion by the witness. To find the defendant 
not guilty, you need not believe that the iden-
tification witness was insincere, but merely 
that [the witness] was mistaken in his [her] 
belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identifi-
cation. In considering whether the prosecu-
tion has proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is the person who commit-
ted the crime, you should consider the follow-
ing: 
1) Did the witness have an adequate oppor-
tunity to observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should con-
sider: 
a) the length of time the witnesses observed 
circumstances. The state of the art in jury 
instructions is not so advanced that the 
failings of Telfaire can be said to disquali-
fy it from use at this point. 
A more complete instruction that reme-
dies many of the problems of the Telfaire 
instruction has recently been proposed. It 
is also more understandable. However, al-
though it appears to be a substantial im-
provement over Telfairef it is even longer 
than the one it would replace.8 If used, it 
b) the distance between the witness and the 
actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features 
were visible and undisguised: 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and 
time of observation; 
e) the presence [or] absence of distracting 
noises or activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the wit-
ness' opportunity to observe the person com-
mitting the crime. 
2) Did the witness have the capacity to ob-
serve the person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should con-
sider whether the witness' capacity was im-
paired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
[You should also consider whether the wit-
ness is of a different race than the criminal 
actor. Identification by a person of a differ-
ent race may be less reliable than identifica-
tion by a person of the same race.] 
[3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to 
the criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should con-
sider whether the witness knew that a crime 
was taking place during the time he [she] 
observed the actor. Even if the witness had 
adequate opportunity and capacity to observe 
the criminal actor, he [she] may not have 
done so unless he [she] was aware that a 
crime was being committed.] 
4) Was the witness' identification of the de-
fendant completely the product of his [her] 
own memory? 
In answering this question, you should con-
sider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the 
witness' original observation and his [her] 
identification of the defendant; 
b) the witness' [mental] capacity and state of 
mind at the time of the identification; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descrip-
tions or identifications riven hv r>th#»r uritn#»«u 
STATE 
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would certainly satisfy our expressed con-
cerns about the need for cautionary in-
structions. 
Acceptable and perhaps shorter instruc-
tions other than the two discussed certainly 
could be constructed, especially for specific 
cases that raise only some of the concerns 
about accurate eyewitness identification. 
We trust that trial counsel and judges will 
be able to produce appropriate instructions 
that satisfy the concerns expressed here 
today. Perhaps, over time, the lessons of 
experience will demonstrate the inherent 
superiority of one type or form of caution-
ary instruction. But in the absence of such 
experience, we decline to dictate precisely 
what that instruction must say. 
The final issue—whether the trial court 
erred in denying Long's tardy motion to 
sever—need not be reached. However, in 
an effort to guide the trial court, which 
may well be faced with the same issue on 
remand, we make the following observa-
tion. On the second day of trial Long 
moved to sever the charge of possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person 
from the aggravated assault and attempted 
murder charges. He claims that denial of 
the motion was prejudicial because it put 
evidence of his prior conviction before the 
same jury that heard evidence on the ag-
gravated assault and attempted murder 
charges. 
[8] Initially, we note that Rule 9 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure justified 
to any other information or influence that 
may have affected the independence of his 
[her] identification; 
jd) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the 
defendant;] 
[e) any instances when the witness, or any 
eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of 
the actor that is inconsistent with the defend-
ant's appearance;] 
f) the circumstances under which the defend-
ant was presented to the witness for identifi-
cation. 
[You may take into account that an identifi-
cation made by picking the defendant from a 
group of similar individuals is generally more 
reliable than an identification made from the 
v. LONG Utah 48 
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the trial court's denial of the motion. " 
defendant's right to severance of offensi 
. . . is waived if the motion is not made 
least five days before trial." U.C.A., 195 
§ 77-35-9 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982). Assumir 
that a timely motion is made on reman 
the issue of severance will be presented 
essentially the same posture as it was 
State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Ufc 
1985). There, we held that refusal to sev 
the possession of a dangerous weapc 
charge from the remaining charges was i 
abuse of discretion because of the unwa 
ranted prejudice inherent in informing tl 
jury that a defendant is a convicted felo 
Here, too, there seems to be no compellir 
reason to present the evidence of pri< 
offenses to the jury that is trying the a 
sault charges. 
The conviction is reversed and the cas 
remanded for a new trial. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concu 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and di 
senting): 
I join the Court in remanding for a ne 
trial on the charge of possession of a da 
gerous weapon. However, I do not agr< 
that because the trial court refused to gr 
a cautionary instruction on the reliability 
eyewitness testimony the defendant is all 
entitled to a new trial on the charge 
aggravated assault. 
[You may also take into account that iden 
fications made from seeing the person a 
generally more reliable than identificatio 
made from a photograph.] 
I again emphasize that the burden of pre 
ing that the defendant is the person who coi 
mitted the crime is on the prosecution. 
after considering the evidence you have hea 
from the prosecution and from the defem 
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimo 
in light of the considerations listed above, y 
have a reasonable doubt about whether t 
defendant is the person who committed t 
crime, you must find him not guilty. 
R. Sanders, Helping the Jury Evaluate f?j 
witness Testimony: The Need for Addition 
Safeguards, 12 AmJ.Crim.L. 189, 222-24 (198 
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In State v. Green,1 the Court stated the 
law in Utah to be: 
In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not 
permitted to comment on the evi-
dence It is the sole and exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the 
facts in all criminal cases, whether the 
evidence offered by the state is weak or 
strong, is in conflict or is not controvert-
ed These principles of law are so 
fundamental in our system of criminal 
procedure that we deem it unnecessary 
to cite cases and authorities in support 
thereof. 
In the cases that have followed, the 
Court has adhered to the principle of law 
espoused in Green and in Utah R.Civ.P. 51 
and Utah R.Crim.P. 19 that a trial judge is 
not permitted to comment on the quality or 
credibility of the evidence and may not 
indicate that the evidence is either weak or 
convincing.2 However, as was observed in 
State v. Sanders,3 the principle of law that 
precludes the trial court from commenting 
on the evidence does not preclude the court 
from including in its instructions general 
statements concerning certain types of evi-
dence. The court is only enjoined from 
commenting on the quality or credibility of 
the evidence in such a way as to indicate 
that it favors the claims or position of 
either party. The enjoinder is necessary to 
prevent any intrusion upon the preroga-
tives of the jury to judge the credibility of 
the evidence and to determine the facts. 
Consistent with these concepts, the Court 
has concluded that the giving of special 
instructions on eyewitness testimony 
should be left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court.4 On appeal, this Court scruti-
1. 78 Utah 580, 589-91, 6 P.2d 177, 181 (1931). 
See also Utah R.Civ.P. 51; Utah R.Crim.P. 19 
(U.C.A., 1953. § 77-35-19 (Repl.Vol. 8C, 1982 
ed.)) (providing that the court shall not com-
ment on the evidence in the case, and if the 
court refers to any of the evidence, it shall 
instruct the jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact). 
2. State v. Rosenbaum, 22 Utah 2d 159. 160, 449 
P.2d 999, 1000 (1969); State v. Sanders, 27 Utah 
2d 354, 362, 496 P.2d 270. 275 (1972). 
3. 27 Utah 2d at 362. 496 P.2d at 275. 
nizes the instructions given to the jury to 
determine if, when viewed as a whole, the 
instructions adequately advised the jury on 
the law pertaining to the case.5 Specifical-
ly, the Court has noted that three general 
instructions cover the same substance as a 
cautionary instruction: (1) that the State 
has the burden to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (2) that the jury is the 
exclusive judge of the credibility of wit-
nesses; and (3) that to find guilt the jury 
must find the defendant committed all of 
the elements of the offense.6 
I am not persuaded by the facts of this 
case that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in declining to give a special caution-
ary instruction in addition to the general 
instructions on burden of proof, reasonable 
doubt, and witness credibility that were 
given. 
The credibility of Jacob Rocha was tested 
on direct and on cross-examination, and 
defense counsel thoroughly explored the 
issue of his credibility in final argument to 
the jury. 
The defendant's theory of the case was 
that he was merely present at the scene 
and that he was incorrectly identified as 
the gunman. However, the defendant rest-
ed at the close of the State's case in chief 
without calling any witnesses. Thus, the 
uncontroverted evidence placed the defend-
ant at the doorway and not in some other 
area where a stray bullet might strike him. 
Furthermore, the evidence was that Rocha 
was able to observe the defendant standing 
alone in the doorway for some thirty sec-
onds attempting to reload the shotgun and 
4. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342. 346 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Utah 
1984); State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 
1984). See also State v. Schaffer, 638 P.2d 1185, 
1187 (Utah 1981); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 
353. 359 (Utah 1980). 
5. Id 
6. Id 
STATE v. LONG 
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that Rocha fired at the defendant and hit 
him. 
The defendant makes no claim of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, and indeed there is 
none. In fact, even if Rocha had been 
unable to identify the defendant as his as-
sailant, the remaining undisputed evidence 
made out a prima facie case upon which the 
jury could deliberate guilt or innocence: 
the defendant was on the scene; the shot-
gun blast came from a lone person who 
appeared in the doorway; that person was 
fired upon by Rocha; and the defendant in 
fact was struck by the bullet fired by Ro-
cha. 
I would affirm the conviction of aggrava-
ted assault. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur in remanding for a new trial on 
the charge of possession of a dangerous 
weapon. 
I would affirm the conviction of aggrava-
ted assault because it does not rest entirely 
on the identification made by Jacob Rocha. 
It is also supported by strong circumstan-
tial evidence. Jacob testified that a man 
(whom he identified as the defendant) fired 
a sawed-off shotgun through the door as it 
was forced open. Jacob was then four to 
five feet away from the door. He "flew 
back" twelve feet and from that location 
looked out the doorway and saw the man 
with the shotgun apparently reloading i t 
Jacob picked up his handgun and fired it at 
the man, who was eighteen to twenty feet 
away. At no time did he see anyone else 
through the doorway other than the man 
who had shot him. According to the testi-
mony of Robin Lee, when the defendant 
and Hobsun returned to their car, it was 
Long and not Hobsun who was wounded. 
The arresting officers also saw that Long 
had been shot As pointed out by the Chief 
Justice, these facts fully support the con-
clusion that it had to be the defendant and 
not someone else who was Jacob's assail-
ant, quite independently of Jacob's eye-
witness identification of the defendant 
I would continue to adhere to our pre 
rule that the giving of a cautionary insl 
tion on eyewitness identification is di* 
tionary with the trial court. Stat 
Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). ] 
lieve that this rule has worked well. ' 
we have not reversed a trial court foi 
fusing a defendant's request, as poi 
out by the majority opinion, fails to p 
otherwise. We have usually, if not ah* 
found evidence corroborating the 
witness identification. When a cautio 
instruction is given, I would favor a 1 
instruction, couched in general cautio 
terms. The instruction suggested in 
majority opinion (and it is only sugge? 
is in my opinion much too long, repetit 
and leads the jury through a defc 
checklist By its sheer length and dets 
overshadows the other instructions ar 
heavily slanted in favor of the defem 
It is not clear whether the jury can rel 
the identification if they have reason 
doubt about any of the twenty consk 
tions which are listed. 
The suggested instruction is also o 
tionable to me because it incorporates 
elusions from the articles relied upon ii 
majority opinion which I am not prep 
to embrace. For example, in factor (3) 
suggested instruction states as a fact 
"[e]ven if the witness had adequate o] 
tunity and capacity to observe the crir 
actor, the witness may not have don 
unless he was aware that a crime 
being committed." While I agree as a 
eral proposition that an observer M 
give more attention to a scene wher 
thought a crime was being committed 
he might ordinarily otherwise do, it b 
means follows that because the obs< 
does not know that a crime is being 
mitted, his identification and perceptioi 
be less accurate or faulty. Some p 
are keenly observant, and their ident 
tion is very reliable if they have an 
quate opportunity to observe. This v 
be true even though the setting was 
ness, social, or casual. The fact tr 
crime was not being committed * 
make no difference. 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the 
information. Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it 
should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged 
should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged. 
ADDENDUM E 
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1 A. Six dollars* 
2 Q. What happened after that? 
3 A. Let's see, after that he just turned 
4 around and he walked out the door. 
5 Q. About how long did this total event 
6 take place? 
7 A. Oh, I figure a minute, maybe two 
8 minutes at the most. 
9 Q. Did you see how he left? 
10 A. Yes, he was walking -- the door faces 
11 to the north, and he walked out the door and around 
12 the side of the building, which is a glass around 
13 this area, and then out towards the sidewalk. 
14 Q. Did you see any vehicle in the 
15 vicinity? 
16 A. Yeah, after he left the store and after 
17 he got to the sidewalk, I pushed the panic button 
18 for the police. Then I ran out the door and ran 
19 over to the gas pumps and down to the sidewalk. I 
20 was watching him jog down the street to 2nd South 
21 and 5th East. He proceeded to get into a car and 
22 the car made a right turn. 
23 Q. What type of a car was that? 
24 A. I said it was a late -- about a mid '80 
25 Camaro. 
1 Q. Do you recall the color? 
2 A. At the time I said it was a gold color. 
3 Q. How far were you away from that? 
4 A. Oh, about 75 yardsf 100 yards. It was 
5 basically one block. 
6 Q. Now besides the coat, did he have any 
7 other clothing on? 
8 A. He had a baseball hat. 
9 Q. What kind was that? 
10 A. It had some words on it, but I didn't 
11 see the words. 
12 Q. And what color was that? 
13 A. To be honest, I really don't remember. 
14 I want to say it was a brown tannish color. 
15 (Whereupon, State's Exhibit 2 was 
16 marked for identification.) 
17 THE COURT: May I approach, Your 
18 Honor? 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 Q. (By Mr. Blaylock) Would you look at 
21 State's proposed Exhibit No. 2. Does that look 
22 familiar at all? 
23 A. I really couldn't tell you to be 
24 honest. I really don't think this is the same one. 
25 Q. Do you have anything further to do with 
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1 Q. Is he the individual that left as you 
2 came in? 
3 A* Yes, he is* 
4 Q. That would be Paul Harbrecht? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What did he tell you had happened? 
7 A. He was working as an employee at the 
8 store, the Top Stop. And a man came into the store 
9 and held him at gun point, basically took the money 
10 from the till. Then asked for his wallet and his 
11 own individual money and took that also. 
12 Q. Did he give you a description of the 
13 person who had committed this robbery? 
14 A. He did give me a very good description. 
15 Q. What was that? 
16 A. Male Hispanic. He said like 20s, about 
17 five seven, to five nine, dark hair, dark eyes. A 
18 clothing description he said a white hat and a 
19 coat. The coat was very descriptive. 
20 Q. While he was filling out the report, 
21 did something occur that caused you to follow up on 
22 this a little bit? 
23 A. Yes, it did. 
24 Q. What was that? 
25 A. I heard an ATL, which is an attempt to 
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locate on a robbery that just occurred at the Pizza 
Hut on Redwood Road, The description of the 
vehicle and of the suspect in that ATL was similar 
if not exact to the description that I had just 
received from the complainant slash victim. 
Q. What had he told you about a vehicle? 
A. He said that it was a Camaro. The way 
the lights were sitting on the road, he couldn't 
see the color really wellf but he could tell it was 
a '70s model Camaro which is the same style of 
vehicle that was described from the other robbery. 
Q. How long did this occur after he had 
been robbed? 
A. Just — 
Q. That you received the attempt to 
locate? 
A. Within minutes. I believe — do you 
have a copy of my report? I think I wrote the 
times. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: My I approach, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Direct opposing counsel to the document 
that you've just handed the witness. 
THE WITNESS: I can refer to that and 
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1 robber had an accent? 
2 A. Sounds familiarr but I don't recall. 
3 Q. It's correct, isn't itf Officer Jones, 
4 that Mr. Harbrecht initially described the vehicle 
5 as being light in color? 
6 A. I thought he said dark in color. 
7 Q. I believe -- I would refresh your 
8 recollection by indicating that I have examined the 
9 notes and so now you do agree with that? 
10 A. I wrote brown or tan, so medium color. 
11 Q. All right. Did you recover any items 
12 of physical evidence in your investigation? 
13 A. Did If myself? 
14 Q. Yes. 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Are you aware of any other items of 
17 physical evidence which were recovered in the 
18 course of the investigation which I have not made a 
19 reference to? 
20 A. The coat. 
21 Q. Okay, anything else? 
22 A. Not at the time I was there. 
23 MR. JOHNSTON: Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: Any redirect? 
25 
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1 A. Yes, I did. 
2 Q. Which one specifically do you recall? 
3 A. I recall hearing the broadcast on both 
4 robberies. I was dispatched as a back up officer 
5 at the Pizza Hut. 
6 Q. What location did you go to? 
7 A. I responded to the area of 700 North 
8 and Redwood Road. I was assigned as a perimeter 
9 car, which means I was to check the surrounding 
10 areas for the suspect or suspect vehicle. 
11 Q. What were you looking for 
12 specifically. What was reported to you? 
13 A. Initially what was reported was a male 
14 Hispanic, dark hair, dark eyes, wearing a -- I 
15 believe it was a blue and green jacket. Shortly 
16 after I arrived there was an update that the 
17 suspect may be in a '78 or late '70s model 
18 Chevrolet Camaro, blue in color. 
19 Q. So what did you do? 
20 A. I proceeded to check the area. I went 
21 eastbound on 700 North from Redwood Road. At 
22 Catherine Circle, which is approximately 1440 West 
23 on 700 North, I noticed a blue Chevy Camaro. It 
24 looked like there was a '70s model parked in the 
25 driveway of one of the apartments. 
187 
Q. To your knowledge, was any money 
recovered from Mr. Maestas? 
A. I don't know, I don't believe so. 
Q. Did you talk to the victim at the Top 
Stop robbery? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did it come to your attention that 
there had been a description of the vehicle used in 
the Top Stop robbery? 
A. Yes, Officer Jones gave me a 
description of the vehicle used. 
Q. And was his description based upon what 
the victim had imparted to him? 
A. Yes, her description was based on that. 
Q. Excuse me, Officer Jones is a female. 
It's correct, is it not, that the vehicle was 
described as light colored vehicle? 
A. The description that was given to me 
was late '70s or early '80s, Chevy Camaro, brown in 
color. 
MR. JOHNSTON: Thank you. I have 
nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Nothing further of this 
witness, Your Honor. 
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1 A. Officer Michelle Sanchez was my backup 
2 officer at the scene, at the Pizza Hut. And after 
3 I had entered the restaurant, she had entered the 
4 restaurant after talking with a witness outside the 
5 parking lot, who reported that he'd seen a blue 
6 Camaro come into the parking lot prior to the 
7 robbery, and leave the parking lot just after the 
8 robbery. 
9 Q. Was there any more description than, 
10 that it was a blue Camaro? 
11 A. The witness that Officer Sanchez spoke 
12 to believed it might be a •77 or '78 Camaro. 
13 Q. As you approached this scene then at 
14 550 North Redwood Road, was there any conversation 
15 between you and victims of these robberies? 
16 A. The conversation that I had with the 
17 victim was prior to leaving the scene. I told them 
18 that the purpose that I was transporting them down 
19 there was to view a possible suspect in the crime. 
20 Q. Did either or both of them say anything 
21 then as you approached? 
22 A. Not that I recall as we approached. I 
23 give them instructions as to what it was that we 
24 were looking for as far as possible 
25 identification. And we approached and stopped and 
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Q. You've indicated that the witness, 
Mr. Martinez, described a Camaro leaving the 
premises at the Top Stop. Could you tell me who 
that was? 
A. Not at the Top Stop, it was at the 
Pizza Hut. 
Q. Excuse me, I meant to say Pizza Hut. 
A. I did not speak to Mr. Martinez 
directly. Officer Sanchez at the restaurant told 
me she had spoken with that witness. 
Q. Do you know where that witness is now? 
A. I don't know where that witness is. 
Q. Were your aware of an investigation 
that involved people allegedly prowling in the 
Catherine Street neighborhood, Catherine Circle 
neighborhood? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you take part in that 
investigation? 
A. I did, immediately following the search 
that Detective Dalling, Officer Cole and I 
conducted at the address 619 North Catherine 
Circle, we searched the immediate area surrounding 
the few houses in that circle. From the radio call 
that came out, there were several juveniles -- one 
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1 We will be in recess for 15 minutes. 
2 (Recess•) 
3 THE COURT: The record will reflect 
41 Mr. Johnston, out of the presence of the juryf 
5 counsel for the defendant, has requested the 
6 opportunity to make a motion out of the jury's 
7 presence. You may proceed. 
8 MR. JOHNSTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 Your Honor and Mr. Blaylock. At this 
10 time I would like to move the Court to enter an 
11 order which strikes the testimony of the previous 
12 witness, I believe it was Officer Findlay, which 
13 testimony pertained to an out-of-court statement, 
14 the origin of which was one Mr. Martinez. The 
15 substance of which was that Mr. Martinez had 
16 observed a blue Camaro leaving the premises of the 
17 Pizza Hut restaurant at or about the time of the 
18 robbery which is the subject of this action. 
19 I submit in support of that, Your 
20 Honor, that it is hearsay, it is an out-of-court 
21 statement which is not subject to the 
22 cross-examination of the defendant, and it's 
23 offered -- Your Honor, whatever the intent of its 
24 offering, I submit that part of it would be to have 
25 a corroborative affect of the color of the Camaro 
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being similar to that of the Camaro owned by the 
defendant. 
In support further of our motion, I 
would indicate to the Court that as this testimony 
came forth, I was unaware that it was coming from 
Mr. Martinez, as Mr. Martinez being the source. I 
had assumed, Your Honor, that the prosecution would 
offer a witness subject to our cross-examination 
which would state the substance of that 
objectionable material, that is the color of the 
vehicle leaving the premises, which color and 
description were similar to the vehicle owned by 
Mr. Maestas. And, therefore, not being aware that 
this witness was not going to be available, we did 
not make an objection at that time. We do desire 
to impose our objection at this time. 
THE COURT: A very brief response. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Your Honor, the state 
offered the evidence to show why Officer Cole did 
what Officer Cole did. It was offered to show that 
that information was the information regarding a 
description of a vehicle which was broadcast over 
the dispatch that Officer Cole wanted to observe 
this Camaro then approached it because it fit the 
general description, not offered to prove the 
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1 matter asserted. Particularly it's offered to show 
2 that he was responding to a 
3 light-typef light-colored vehicle. 
4 THE COURT: The Court finds, if both 
5 sides have completed their argument, that the 
6 statement of the officer is hearsay. There is a 
7 time honored exception to the hearsay rule where 
8 evidence of that nature is offered not to establish 
9 the truth of the fact, but simply to give meaning 
10 to the trier of fact on what the officer did. In 
11 this particular case in response to that evidence. 
12 The record should reflect that most of 
13 the witnesses described the car as a different 
14 color than blue. Some said it was a light color, 
15 some said it was tan, some said it was brown, they 
16 all described it as a Camaro. And the officer 
17 testified that someone at the Pizza Hut saw this 
18 blue Camaro going into the parking lot prior to the 
19 robbery, was there a very short time and left 
20 immediately after the robbery. 
21 And based on that information, the 
22 officer conducted an independent investigation and 
23 after seeing the car parked, determining the engine 
24 had been operating within just a short time prior 
25 to his touching the hood with his hands, and 
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1 observing the crumpled up money in the coat from 
2 the backseat then staked the car out. And when the 
3 defendant came out of the apartment complex, 
4 arrested him. 
5 And the Court finds that the testimony 
6 was not offered to prove that the car seen arriving 
7 at the Pizza Hut parking lot shortly before the 
8 robbery and leaving shortly thereafter was in fact 
9 the car used in the robbery, simply it was used to 
10 give meaning to the officer's investigation after 
11 he has received the information. The motion is 
12 stricken. Bring the jury in. 
13 You may be seated. The record will 
14 reflect the presence of the jury, both counsel and 
15 the defendant. 
16 Court has been in session out of your 
17 presence on some matters, legal, as opposed to 
18 factual in nature. Those matter have been resolved 
19 and now we're ready to proceed with the 
20 presentation of the evidence. 
21 Call your next witness. 
22 THE COURT: Step forward and be sworn. 
2 3 RAY E. DALLING, 
24 called as a witness, having been first duly 
25 sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
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Defendant. 
The undersigned Roger S. Blaylock, a Salt Lake County District Attorney, under oath 
states on information and belief that the defendant, committed the crimes of: 
COUNTI 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 488 East 100 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Top Stop from the person or immediate presence of Paul Herbrecht, and 
in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous 
weapon, to-wit: a gun, further a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the representation 
of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery, 
giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended. 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. GINO MAESTAS 
DAO No. 95 002115 
Page 2 
COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Jesse Baldwin of Pizza Hut from the person or immediate presence of 
Jesse Baldwin of Pizza Hut, and in the course of committing said robbery used or 
threatened the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, further a firearm or a facsimile 
of a firearm or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance 
of the Aggravated Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Candace Hsiao from the person or immediate presence of Candace 
Hsiao, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a 
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated 
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
COUNT IV 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Kara Hsiao from the person or immediate presence of Kara Hsiao, and 
in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a dangerous 
weapon, to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated 
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. GINO MAESTAS 
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COUNT VIII 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 787 North Redwood Road, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 20 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, 
Section 302, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, GINO 
MAESTAS, a party to the offense, unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
the possession of Jesse Baldwin from the person or immediate presence of Jessee 
Baldwin, and in the course of committing said robbery used or threatened the use of a 
dangerous weapon to-wit: a gun, further, that a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm or the 
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the Aggravated 
Robbery, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided by §76-3-203, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
D. Cole, Rose M. Jones, Ray Dalling, Paul Herbrecht, R. Findlay, Don Cole, Ray 
Dalling, Dave Ward, Frank Werner, Jesse Baldwin, Candace Hsiao, Kera Hsiao, Kurt 
Anderson, Leslie Kurys, Shelby Kurys and Mary Ellen Sisneros 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Affiant, a Salt Lake City Detective, bases this information upon the statements of 
Paul Harbrecht, clerk at Top Stop, 488 East 100 South, that February 20, 1995, at 8:06 PM, a 
male Hispanic person wearing a white baseball cap and a two-tone waist length blue-green jacket 
and whom he has identified as the defendant, came into the store, pointed a revolver at Mr. 
Harbrecht, demanded money from the cash register and from Mr. Harbrecht's wallet; that after 
the defendant left, Mr. Harbrecht saw him get into a light colored 1970fs Camero. 
Affiant also bases this information upon the statements of Jesse Baldwin, night shift 
supervisor at Pizza Hut, 787 North Redwood Road, that February 20, 1995, at 8:44 PM a male 
Hispanic person, wearing a white baseball cap and a two-tone blue-green jacket and whom he 
has identified as the defendant, pointed a revolver at various people in the Pizza Hut, including at 
Mr. Baldwin, demanding money from the cash register and from the safe; that he pointed the 
revolver at Candice Hsiao, demanding money from her which she gave him from her day 
planner; that he pointed the revolver at Kara Hsiao, demanding the crumpled dollar bills that 
Kara had in her hand; that he pointed the revolver at Leslie Kurys and Shelby Kurys, demanding 
their wedding rings. 
ADDENDUM G 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Gino Maestas, of the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count II of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 20th day of February, 1995, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gino Maestas, 
took personal property then in the possession of Pizza Hut, from 
the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Jesse Baldwin; 
and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a 
dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Gino Maestas, of the 
offense of Aggravated Robbery as charged in count VIII of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 20th day of February, 1995, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Gino Maestas, 
took personal property then in the possession of Jesse Baldwin, 
from the person or immediate presence of Jesse Baldwin; and 
2. That such taking was unlawful; and 
3. That such taking was intentional; and 
4. That such taking was against the will of Jesse Baldwin; 
and 
5. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or 
fear; and 
6. That in the course of committing such taking, a 
dangerous weapon was used. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robbery as charged 
in count VIII of the information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of count VIII. 
